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Corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives can be studied as an investment, a signaling 
device, and/or an agency problem. In this paper, we focus on the investment and signaling 
hypotheses, and thus examine the association between CSR and future realized earnings and cash 
flow from operations (CFO). We find that CSR has negative long-term relation to both earnings 
and CFO, but there is no short-term evidence. These findings could be linked to the agency costs 
of CSR, a lower cost of equity of responsible firms, or both. Furthermore, the volatility of earnings 
negatively moderates the CSR effect on future earnings, i.e. it is different for stable and volatile 
firms. After raising social responsibility, stable firms experience no escalation in volatility, while 
having smaller losses in the long-run compared to volatile firms. On the contrary, volatile firms 
that engage in CSR tend to post a short-term reduction in volatility, followed by a sharp fall in the 
long-term earnings. Admittedly, when we account for the unobserved year effects, the only robust 
results are that CSR leads to a decline in the cash flow from operations, and a lower earnings 
volatility at volatile companies. Hence, while our results cast doubt whether CSR signals higher 





I cannot stress enough how grateful I am to my supervisors, Dr. Min Maung and Dr. Craig 
Wilson, for the unparalleled guidance, support, and patience throughout my time in the 
MSc Finance program. Also, I express my gratitude to Dr. Abdullah Mamun, the Graduate Chair, 
for providing invaluable extracurricular opportunities and for keeping me on track. Furthermore, 
I would like to thank Ms. Wanda Gonda, Ms. Chandra Kretzer, and all staff for their consistent 
help and encouragement. I also want to thank my classmates for the camaraderie and humor. Last, 
but not least, I am forever grateful to my family. Without their unconditional love, none of this 
would have happened.  
  
 iv 
Table of contents 
Permission to Use ............................................................................................................................ i 
Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... ii 
Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................................... iii 
Table of contents ............................................................................................................................ iv 
List of tables .................................................................................................................................... v 
Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 1 
Chapter 1: Literature review and hypotheses development ...................................................... 3 
1.1. Stakeholder theory ........................................................................................................................... 3 
1.2. Signaling and agency theories ......................................................................................................... 5 
1.3. Economic theory ............................................................................................................................... 9 
1.4. Hypotheses development ................................................................................................................. 9 
Chapter 2: Data ............................................................................................................................ 11 
2.1. Sample ............................................................................................................................................. 11 
2.2. CSR variables ................................................................................................................................. 11 
2.3. Accounting variables...................................................................................................................... 12 
2.4. Summary and correlation statistics .............................................................................................. 13 
Chapter 3: Methodology .............................................................................................................. 15 
3.1. H1: CSR and future changes in earnings/CFO ........................................................................... 15 
3.2. H2: Stable and volatile firms ......................................................................................................... 19 
Chapter 4: Empirical results ....................................................................................................... 21 
4.1. H1: CSR and future changes in earnings/CFO ........................................................................... 21 
4.2. H2: Stable and volatile firms ......................................................................................................... 24 
Chapter 5: Robustness tests ........................................................................................................ 26 
5.1. Levels of earnings/CFO ................................................................................................................. 26 
5.1. Advertising and R&D expenditures ............................................................................................. 26 
5.3. Alternative CSR scores .................................................................................................................. 27 
Chapter 6: Limitations and future research .............................................................................. 29 
6.1. Advanced methodology.................................................................................................................. 29 
6.2. Different hypotheses ...................................................................................................................... 29 
Conclusions ................................................................................................................................... 31 
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................. 32 
Appendix ....................................................................................................................................... 40 
List of variable definitions .................................................................................................................... 40 
Summary and correlation statistics ..................................................................................................... 50 
Empirical results ................................................................................................................................... 52 




List of tables 
 
Table 2.1: Summary statistics ….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…….50 
Table 2.2: Correlation statistics….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…...51 
Table 4.1: H1 - Linear models of changes in earnings (fixed firm effects) ….….….….…...…...52 
Table 4.2: H1 - Linear models of changes in earnings (random year effects) ….….….….….….53 
Table 4.3: H1 - Non-linear models of changes in earnings (fixed firm effects) ….….….….…...54 
Table 4.4: H1 - Non-linear models of changes in earnings (random year effects) ..….….….…..55 
Table 4.5: H1 - Linear models of changes in CFO (fixed firm effects)..….….….….….….…….56 
Table 4.6: H1 - Linear models of changes in CFO (random year effects) ….….….….….….…..57 
Table 4.7: H1 - Non-linear models of changes in CFO (fixed firm effects) ….….….….….…....58 
Table 4.8: H1 - Non-linear models of changes in CFO (random year effects) ….….….….…….59 
Table 4.9: H2A - Changes in earnings of stable and volatile firms (fixed firm effects) ….….….60 
Table 4.10: H2A - Changes in earnings of stable and volatile firms (random year effects) ….…61 
Table 4.11: H2B - Earnings volatility (fixed firm effects) ….….….….….….….….….….……..62 
Table 4.12: H2B - Earnings volatility (random year effects) ….….….….….….….….….….…..63 
Table 5.1: Earnings levels….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….64 
Table 5.2: CFO levels….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…...65 
Table 5.3: Advertising and R&D expenditures….….….….….….….….….….….….….….……66 
Table 5.4: Conservative CSR (ex. Corporate Governance and Product) ….….….….….….……67 
Table 5.5: Internal CSR (Diversity and Employee Relations) ….….….….….….….….…68 






Corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives have reached unprecedented levels across 
the globe (Becchetti et al., 2016). Being so widespread and controversial, these practices have 
captured the attention of executives, investors, politicians, and academics. Levitt (1958) and 
Friedman (1970) initiated a debate over theoretical and practical implications of CSR. During the 
50-year debate, researchers applied a number of theories. Among them, the stakeholder, signaling, 
agency, and economic theories stand out (Stiglitz, 2000; McWilliams et al., 2006, Zerbini, 2015). 
As conflicting evidence began piling up, it became apparent that potential links between CSR and 
financial performance are indirect and thus a search for causal mechanisms started 
(Orlitzky et al., 2003; Margolis et al., 2009).  
The stakeholder theory suggests that CSR can be strategic (Baron, 2001; McWilliams et al., 
2006). Specifically, CSR can be linked to financial performance via intangible assets and 
stakeholder engagement (Barnett and Salomon, 2012; Mishra, 2017), as well as an insurance-like 
protection (Schnietz and Epstein, 2005; Godfrey et al., 2009). Meanwhile, the signaling and 
agency views consider endorsement effects (Zerbini, 2015), institutional voids (Su et al., 2016), 
transparency and cost of capital (Cheng et al., 2014), overinvestment (Barnea and Rubin, 2010), 
entrenchment (Cronqvist et al., 2009), risk aversion (Bouslah et al., 2013; Kim et al., 2014), and 
competitive advantages (Brammer and Millington, 2008). 
Based on these theories, CSR practices can act as an investment, a signaling device, and/or 
an agency problem. We focus on the investment and signaling hypotheses, and thus study the 
association between CSR and future realized financial performance. To measure the financial 
performance, we use earnings before extraordinary items and cash flow from operations (CFO). 
CFO serves as a robustness check and as a cleaner metric of macroeconomic and industry-specific 
dynamics. Specifically, unlike earnings, CFO does not have accounting issues such as mismatches 
between revenues and expenses, aggressive accrual estimates, earnings smoothing behavior 
(Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Dichev and Tang, 2008; and Dichev and Tang, 2009). Following 
Dichev and Tang (2009), we expect the volatilities of earnings and CFO to negatively moderate 
the effect of CSR.  
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Using a battery of fixed firm effects and random year effects models, we find no evidence of 
a short-term association between CSR and future realized earnings or CFO, but there is a 
negative long-term relation. The lack of short-term findings could be caused by significant mean 
reversion and autocorrelation in earnings, as well as omitted variables or interactions acting as 
more reliable signals (Jaccard and Turrisi, 2003; Servaes and Tamayo, 2013; Su et al., 2016). 
The picture does not change if we control for advertising and R&D expenditures or use alternative 
CSR measures (conservative, internal, and external CSR). Furthermore, the negative long-term 
effect might be connected to the agency costs of CSR projects (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
Tirole, 2001; Jensen, 2002), to socially responsible firms having a lower cost of equity 
(El Ghoul et al., 2011), or to a combination of these opposing arguments. 
In addition, the volatility of earnings inversely moderates the relation between CSR and 
future earnings, i.e. it is different for stable and volatile firms. After enhancements in CSR, stable 
firms experience no escalation in volatility, while having smaller losses in the long-run compared 
to volatile firms. In contrast, volatile firms that raise their social responsibility tend to post a short-
term reduction in volatility, followed by a sharp fall in the long-term earnings. Granted, when we 
account for the random year effects, the only robust results are that CSR leads to a decline in the 
cash flow from operations, and a lower earnings volatility at volatile companies. Thus, our findings 
suggest that socially responsible initiatives could only be effective at signaling lower earnings 
volatility (caused by potential accounting issues), and not at communicating higher earnings or 
profitability. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Chapter 1 discusses the stakeholder, signaling, 
agency, and economic theories; Chapter 2 describes sampling, calculations, summary, and 
correlation statistics; Chapter 3 explains the methodology; Chapter 4 analyzes the empirical results; 




Chapter 1: Literature review and hypotheses development 
There are multiple definitions of corporate social responsibility and related concepts. 
Carroll (1999) analyzed how CSR had evolved to become a recognized multidimensional 
construct. The key parts of the modern definition are voluntary basis, stakeholders, society, 
environment, and corporate governance (Dahlsrud, 2008). From the economics perspective, CSR 
is an attempt of a firm to internalize the welfare of different stakeholders (Tirole, 2001). Therefore, 
we proceed with the following definition: “Corporate social responsibility is a voluntary practice 
of integrating social, environmental, and corporate governance concerns into business operations 
and interactions with stakeholders”.  
Given the complex nature of the topic, there are parallel lines of literature from the 
perspectives of management, corporate finance, economics. The academic interest in corporate 
social responsibility was preceded by the environmentalism and human rights movements of the 
60s and 70s (Hill et al., 2007). Empirical research on CSR thus spans almost 50 years, while 
theoretical work can be traced back for centuries1. Levitt (1958) and Friedman (1970) initiated a 
debate over theoretical and practical implications of CSR. During the debate, researchers applied 
a number of theories. Among them, the stakeholder, signaling, agency, and economic theories 
dominate (Stiglitz, 2000; McWilliams et al., 2006, Zerbini, 2015).  
Researchers focused on whether CSR affects financial performance in its accounting, market, 
or mixed forms (e.g., profitability, firm value, Tobin’s Q). So far, the consensus is that there is a 
small positive relationship (Orlitzky et al., 2003; Margolis et al., 2009). However, there is also 
conflicting evidence indicating negative, convex, and concave associations (Brammer and 
Millington, 2008). As this evidence began piling up, it became apparent that potential links 
between CSR and financial performance are indirect (Orlitzky et al., 2003; Margolis et al., 2009).  
1.1. Stakeholder theory 
The modern stakeholder theory was outlined by Freeman (1984). Mitchell et al. (1997) 
expanded the Freeman’s definition of a stakeholder by combining the concepts of power, 
                                                 
1 The concept of corporate citizenship stems from Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations (1776) 
and, if we consider political philosophy, from Aristotle’s Politics (350 BC) and Plato’s Republic 
(380 BC). 
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legitimacy, and urgency. The central idea is that companies should not ignore or mistreat any party 
that a) can affect (help or hurt) or be affected by the business; b) has legitimate stakes in the firm 
(contracts, rights, risks, moral claims); and c) must be dealt with immediately. Otherwise, 
mistreated groups withdraw their support (McWilliams et al., 2006). Thus, stakeholder theory is 
focused on managing relationships and reducing contracting costs.  
Most importantly, stakeholder theory considers CSR an investment. Accordingly, 
Baron (2001) coined the term “strategic CSR”, which refers to CSR being used for value-seeking 
purposes. McWilliams et al. (2006) point out that such behavior can be viewed as a positive 
externality. For instance, they write, “providing day care may lower the number of juvenile crimes 
in a community, but the firm might provide the day care only because it increases the availability 
of workers and lowers the cost of absenteeism”. Although stakeholder theory does not address the 
inherent agency problems, management literature does recognize them. In fact, it separates 
“stakeholder management” from “social issues participation” (Hillman and Keim, 2001). 
Theoretically, financial performance suffers as soon as the company engages in activities irrelevant 
to its stakeholders (Brammer and Millington, 2008). 
Intangible assets and stakeholder engagement represent major links between CSR and 
financial performance. Similar to R&D and advertising, CSR (in the form of socially responsible 
products, cause-oriented marketing, philanthropy) has been argued to enhance brand evaluation 
and customer loyalty, as well as to attract new customers (Hillman and Keim, 2001; 
Hill et al., 2007; Servaes and Tamayo, 2013). In contrast, Bagnoli and Watts (2003) demonstrate 
that CSR initiatives are negatively related to the intensity of industry competition and the 
willingness of consumers to pay premiums for CSR products. Furthermore, consumer preferences 
could cause a U-shaped relation between CSR and financial performance. Companies that choose 
either high differentiation or low cost strategies may outperform those “in the middle” (Porter, 
1980). Findings of Bhattacharya and Sen (2004) hint that socially irresponsible firms could attract 
price-sensitive consumers, while the affluent and socially conscious flock to the CSR brands 
(Brammer and Millington, 2008). Likewise, CSR could be used to attract, motivate, and retain 
high-quality talent (Turban and Greening, 1997; Brekke and Nyborg, 2008). 
Furthermore, Barnett (2007) and Barnett and Salomon (2012) advocate for the concept of 
“stakeholder influence capacity” (SIC) – the ability of companies to profitably execute CSR 
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initiatives over time. SIC resonates with the signaling theory, as it is path-dependent and expensive 
to observe and imitate. The researchers demonstrate that SIC can explain the U-shaped association 
between CSR and financial performance. In addition, stakeholder relationships can be challenging 
because of the implicit nature of some of the contracts (McGuire, 1988). An unsatisfied party can 
withdraw from an implicit agreement and make it explicit, thus increasing the transaction costs. 
Deng et al. (2013) adds that stakeholders are more likely to enter less favorable explicit contracts 
with highly socially responsible firms who commit to implicit agreements. Moreover, CSR can 
attract funding from socially conscious investors (Hill et al., 2007). 
CSR is also hypothesized to act as insurance against regulatory, legislative, or fiscal risks 
(Hillman and Keim, 2001; Schnietz and Epstein, 2005). Naturally, the question is whether CSR 
can preserve financial performance. Godfrey et al. (2009) assess that with an event study of 178 
negative legal and regulatory actions. The researchers argue that while “primary” CSR (aimed at 
employees, suppliers) is irrelevant in such cases, the social/institutional CSR does resemble 
insurance.  
Stakeholder theory is widely recognized among scholars and practitioners, sometimes being 
called a “central paradigm for the business and society field” (Jones, 1995). However, its popularity 
poses serious corporate governance concerns (Tirole, 2001; Jensen, 2002). Those who embrace 
and practice the stakeholder theory are likely to be doing so because its unaccountable nature 
enables satisfaction of personal preferences at the expense of the firm’s financial claimants and 
society in general (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Jensen, 2002). 
Furthermore, Jensen (2002) asserts that stakeholder theory is fundamentally flawed without the 
definition of “better versus worse”, i.e. without a way for companies to choose among incompatible 
stakeholder interests. Specifically, stakeholder approach does not provide a clear objective function 
for the board of directors and managers to maximize. Moreover, Jensen argues, any firm whose 
goal is to internalize the welfare of stakeholders has no chance of survival facing competitors who 
instead maximize the enterprise value.  
1.2. Signaling and agency theories 
The core of the signaling and agency theories is the asymmetry of information about certain 
qualities or actions (i.e., imperfect or costly information). Stiglitz (2000) summarized two 
solutions: self-selection (signaling) and direct selection (incentives, monitoring). Spence (1973) 
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proposed a signaling model where job applicants could reveal their unobserved abilities to 
employers with observable characteristics (by obtaining higher levels of education). Using 
agriculture and insurance markets as examples, Stiglitz (1974) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) 
demonstrated how the uninformed participant could apply incentives and monitoring in order to 
unveil hidden characteristics and/or direct actions of the party in question. However, there is a flip 
side, as the informed agent can create noise (make knowledge sufficiently expensive to obtain) in 
order to increase their rent (Stiglitz, 2000). 
In the corporate context, the ownership and control of the firm are separated due to the 
benefits of specialization (Stiglitz, 2000). Hence, shareholders possess imperfect information about 
the qualities and actions of corporate executives. Jensen and Meckling (1976) showed how such 
asymmetric information poses the principal-agent problem, whereby the utilities of managers and 
shareholders are misaligned, thus causing a waste of firm’s resources.  
On the one hand, executives could signal the firm’s qualities via investing, financing, 
dividend policy, or risk management decisions. Leland and Pyle (1977) and Allen and 
Faulhaber (1989) analyzed signals in the IPO setting, while Ross (1977) and Harris and 
Raviv (1985) studied the debt issuance. The traditional dividend signaling theory was pioneered 
by Bhattacharaya (1979), John and Williams (1985), Miller and Rock (1985), and was extended 
for stock repurchases by Williams (1988), Hausch and Seward (1993) and Persons (1994).  
On the other hand, interests could be aligned via incentives such as increased insider 
ownership (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Morck et al., 1988). In addition, better corporate 
governance could enforce screening and accountability (Navarro, 1988; Jones, 1995; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997; Tirole, 2001). Furthermore, the bondholders of the firm could impose debt 
covenants and their own supervision (Gilson, 1990; Diamond, 1991; Barnea and Rubin, 2010). 
Also, the market for corporate control (takeovers, leveraged buyouts, proxy fights) could weed out 
ineffective managers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Tirole, 2001; Pagano and Volpin, 2005). 
Zerbini (2015) provides a research framework of CSR signaling. In particular, it is helpful to 
distinguish between direct signals and endorsement signals. Within CSR, Zerbini classifies 
warranties, ethics committees, and corporate disclosures as direct signals, whereas certifications, 
memberships, and ratings (e.g., KLD ratings) are the third-party endorsements. On the empirical 
side, Su et al. (2016) present evidence of CSR signaling higher Tobin’s Q in ten Asian developing 
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economies (CLSA data). Furthermore, the researchers demonstrate that the signal’s strength 
depends on the maturity and information diffusion of the economy. In other words, CSR seems to 
be helpful in markets characterized by institutional voids, but its signal drowns in the sea of reliable 
information of the more developed markets (Su et al., 2016). 
While empirical literature on CSR signaling is limited, endorsement effects have been 
documented in the management literature. King et al. (2005) conclude that certifications of 
management standards (ISO 14001) reduce information asymmetries between companies and 
customers, and thus act as a signal. In addition, Montiel et al. (2012) argue that the signaling power 
of certifications is even more pronounced in corrupt environments because of the greater concerns 
regarding business conduct. Furthermore, the Ramchander et al. (2012) event study demonstrates 
that additions (deletions) to the Domini Social 400 index positively (negatively) affect firm 
valuations. Notably, the effects are opposite for the announcing firms and their competitors, as well 
as more prominent in opaque industries.  
Transparency and cost of capital are another links between CSR and financial performance. 
In a rigorous study, El Ghoul et al. (2011) conclude that socially responsible firms enjoy lower 
implied cost of equity. The researchers apply a battery of models to the forecasted earnings and 
stock prices in order to deduce the ex ante cost of equity. Moreover, tobacco and nuclear power 
companies have higher cost of equity financing than comparable firms in other industries. As for 
the cost of debt, Goss and Roberts (2011) find that banks seem to care about CSR only when 
dealing with low-quality borrowers, while the loan terms and premiums for companies with strong 
balance sheets are unaffected by CSR. Using the Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database, Cheng et al. 
(2014) follow up with supporting evidence of relaxed capital constrains at companies with superior 
CSR. 
Researchers have also examined if CSR could play into competitive advantages 
(Hill et al., 2007). Theoretically, firms whose goal is to address incompatible stakeholder interests 
have no chance of survival facing value-maximizing competitors (Jensen,  2002). Moreover, 
empirical evidence shows that competitive advantages of CSR, R&D, and product quality are 
unsustainable when they can be cheaply observed and imitated (Dutta et al., 1995; 
Reinhardt, 1998; Hoppe and Lehmann-Grube, 2001; McWilliams et al., 2006; 
Brammer and Millington, 2008). 
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Overinvestment is also a major link between corporate social responsibility and financial 
performance. Barnea and Rubin (2010) demonstrate that companies with higher management 
ownership and leverage undertake less CSR initiatives. The researchers argue that this reflects the 
convergence of interests and bondholder monitoring. Overinvestment might also happen if 
executives view CSR as a non-monetary benefit or a “pet project” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Jensen, 2002). A related dichotomy is "profit-making" and "profit-
spending", under which CSR is deemed a luxury (Freeman, 1984). For example, Videras and 
Owen (2006) show that contributions to environmental causes increase personal life satisfaction 
and create a so-called “warm-glow” effect. Correspondingly, expenditures driven solely by 
personal agendas are considered wasteful and financial performance suffers (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997; Tirole, 2001; Jensen, 2002).  
Entrenchment constitutes another causal mechanism behind CSR. In contrast to the 
convergence-of-interests hypothesis (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), entrenchment represents a 
potential negative effect of insider ownership (Morck et al., 1988). It is usually associated with job 
security, employees, and takeover threats. For instance, Pagano and Volpin (2005) construct a 
theoretical model where managers grant long-term contracts and high long-term wages to workers, 
who then act as a “shark repellent” and “white squires”. That is, employees with job security resist 
hostile takeovers in favor of the incumbent executives. Using Swedish employer-employee panel 
data, Cronqvist et al. (2009) find supporting evidence to this hypothesis.  
Last, but not least, managers’ risk aversion could lead to positive but diminishing impact 
(upside-down U-shape) of CSR on financial performance (Brammer and Millington, 2008). 
If executive’s wealth and job security rest on the company’s value (Donaldson, 1961; 
Williamson, 1964), a risk-averse manager will overinvest in unprofitable CSR projects as long as 
they reduce the firm-specific risk. This would go against the interests of the diversified and risk-
neutral shareholders (Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). In addition, Jo and Na (2012) use U.S. 
data and find that CSR reduces risk only in controversial industries. This supports the hypothesis 
that executives in these industries are more risk averse and use CSR as a risk management device. 
Furthermore, Kim et al. (2014) demonstrate that CSR can backfire when used to cover up negative 
news and thus exacerbates the risk of a stock price crash. 
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1.3. Economic theory 
The economic theory is associated with the social welfare, imperfect competition, 
externalities, and economic policy. Revisiting Adam Smith’s arguments, Jensen (2002) discussed 
that, in theory, social welfare is maximized whenever all firms in the economy maximize their 
enterprise value. In other words, as long as the consumers of final goods and services value them 
more than the raw inputs (society’s limited resources), the firms should continue producing. Jensen 
pointed out that such claim assumes that the transactions with input owners and consumers are 
voluntary. Also, such economy allows the existence of the producer and consumer surpluses. 
Put another way, there are no monopolies, oligopolies (cartels), and/or externalities, which is not 
the case in real life. Traditional example of an externality is the water and air pollution 
(Coase, 1960; Jensen, 2002). 
On the one hand, preventing imperfect competition and externalities is the government’s role. 
Friedman (1970) asserted that the most the society can ask from business is to obey the law and 
avoid causing harm. If managers start choosing and implementing any social initiatives beyond 
that, they would be effectively doing the government’s job (Levitt, 1958). However, it is not 
realistic to consider the government an efficient allocator of resources either, as documented in the 
economic policy literature (Stigler, 1982; Winston, 2006). In fact, government’s weaknesses and 
limitations are well-known: corruption, incompatible agendas, limited budgets, lack of information 
and communication (Winston, 2006; Rittenberg and Tregarthen, 2009). On the other hand, 
Coase (1960), Jensen and Meckling (1992), and Jensen (2002) discussed how imperfect 
competition and externalities could also be solved by assigning alienable decision rights to 
decision-makers. Theoretically, an alienable decision right positions its owner “to bear the full 
costs or to capture the full rewards of their actions”. 
1.4. Hypotheses development 
Stakeholder, signaling, agency, and economic theories help in a variety of corporate finance 
topics and make modern firms carefully consider how their actions are interpreted by other market 
participants (Stiglitz, 2000; Tirole, 2001). In particular, they raise important questions about social 
responsibility. Overall, CSR can be studied as a signaling device, as an agency problem, or as an 
investment. Can managers use CSR as a signal of good prospects? How should the board of 
directors incentivize and monitor managers when it comes to social initiatives? Can managers 
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maximize firm value and performance through profitable CSR investments like R&D or 
marketing? 
In this paper we focus on the investment and signaling hypotheses, but we do not distinguish 
between them (i.e., we attribute evidence to both of them). Also, the agency hypothesis remains 
intriguing to explore. The key point of CSR signaling hypothesis is that the company does not 
invest in CSR with an objective to improve its performance. Instead, the firm engages in CSR 
because it anticipates good prospects and wants to convincingly communicate that. We use 
earnings before extraordinary items and cash flow from operations (CFO) to measure financial 
performance. Following Dichev and Tang (2009), we expect the volatilities of earnings and CFO 
to negatively moderate the effect of CSR. Thus, here are the hypotheses we test: 
Hypothesis 1A: Changes in CSR have a positive effect on the future changes in earnings (or CFO) 
Hypothesis 1B: The volatility of earnings (or CFO) negatively moderates the effect of changes in 
CSR on the future changes in earnings (or CFO) 
Hypothesis 2A: For low-volatility firms, changes in CSR have a positive effect on the future 
changes in earnings (or CFO) 
Hypothesis 2B: For high-volatility firms, changes in CSR have a negative effect on the future 
volatility of earnings (or CFO) 
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Chapter 2: Data  
2.1. Sample 
This study is based on corporate social responsibility (CSR) and accounting data. 
CSR variables are sourced from the MSCI ESG KLD STATS database (“MSCI KLD” hereafter), 
which was created in 1991 by KLD Research & Analytics (Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini) and 
acquired by MSCI in 2010. Accounting variables are sourced from the Compustat Monthly 
Updates North America Fundamentals Annual and Quarterly databases (“Compustat” hereafter). 
Our merged sample of CSR and accounting variables dates from 1991 to 2015 and totals 
19,831 firm-years. First, we follow standard practice and filter out the highly regulated financial 
and utility firms (SIC codes 6000-6999 and 4900-4999, respectively). Then, we trim firms with 
the book value of equity below US$ 5 million and the book value of assets below US$ 10 million 
(Fama and French, 2000). After that, we exclude firms which in a given year recorded a loss before 
extraordinary items or a negative cash flow from operations (CFO) larger than the book value of 
assets in the same year (ROA > -100% or ROA_CFO > -100%). Also, we exclude firms which in a 
given year recorded a decline in earnings or CFO larger than the book value of assets in the 
previous year (PC_EARN > -100% or PC_CFO > -100%). Then, we winsorize all variables at the 
1st and 99th percentiles of their empirical distributions. Finally, we filter out missing observations 
in key variables – percentage point changes in earnings and changes in the CSR net percentage 
score (PC_EARN, PC_CSR). Descriptions and calculations of variables are provided in the rest of 
this section, in the table notes, and in the Appendix. 
2.2. CSR variables 
We use MSCI KLD metrics as proxies for CSR investment (cash outflow in CSR initiatives). 
The dollar amount of CSR is usually underestimated, as some of its aspects are lumped with other 
accounting items like R&D or advertising, while the charity donations are relatively small and do 
not have to be reported (McWilliams and Siegel, 2000; Barnea and Rubin, 2010). 
MSCI KLD data has seven categories: Corporate Governance, Community, Diversity, 
Employee Relations, Environment, Human Rights, and Product2. Each category is measured with 
                                                 
2 We exclude the industry-based categories: Alcohol, Gaming, Firearms, Military, Nuclear, 
Tobacco. 
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individual indicators of strengths and concerns. For a given firm and year, each indicator can be 
documented or researched. A value of “1” says the indicator is researched and documented (the 
firm met the assessment criteria in that year), whereas a value of “0” means it is just researched 
(the firm did not meet the assessment criteria in that year). We do not consider cases when 
indicators are not researched (“R”) or missing (“NA”). As such, a strength indicator with value “1” 
is understood as “good” for a given firm and year, while a concern indicator with value “1” is 
understood as “bad”. Interpretation switches if the strength and concern indicators are “0”. 
As noted by Servaes and Tamayo (2013), Deng et al. (2013), Beccetti et al. (2016), numbers 
of documented CSR strengths and concerns (ones) are not comparable across years and categories 
because of the variation in the number of researched indicators (ones and zeroes). Therefore, we 
compute total and category-specific percentage scores of CSR strengths (concerns) as the number 
of documented strengths (concerns) scaled by the number of researched strengths (concerns)3. 
Then, the CSR net score is calculated by subtracting the concerns percentage score from the 
strengths percentage score. Finally, we compute the annual changes in the CSR net percentage 
score for each firm (PC_CSR). 
2.3. Accounting variables 
Balance sheet variables 
Following Grullon et al. (2005) and Coles et al. (2006), we calculate market-to-book ratio 
(MB) as a proxy for the Tobin’s Q. We divide the sum of the market value of equity and the book 
value of debt by the book value of assets, and then take the natural logarithm of the ratio. Also, 
we take the natural logarithm of the book value of assets as a gauge of the firm’s size (SIZE). 
In addition, leverage (LEV) is defined as a percentage ratio of the book value of long-term debt to 
the book value of assets (Core, 2006). 
Earnings/CFO, profitability, volatility, mean reversion 
We use earnings before extraordinary items (“earnings” hereafter) and cash flow from 
operations (CFO) to measure financial performance. On the one hand, CFO serves as a straight-
forward robustness check. On the other hand, CFO-based variables have their own interpretation. 
                                                 
3 The empirical results are not affected if we calculate the CSR net score based on unscaled CSR 
strengths and concerns, i.e. if we ignore the number of researched strengths and concerns. 
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Borrowing insights from Dechow and Dichev (2002) and Dichev and Tang (2008, 2009), we can 
think of CFO as a cleaner metric of macroeconomic and industry-specific drivers of firm 
performance. Specifically, unlike earnings, CFO does not have accounting issues such as 
mismatches between revenues and expenses, aggressive accrual estimates, earnings smoothing 
behavior, etc. Consistent with Fama and French (2000), Nissim and Ziv (2001), and 
Grullon et al. (2005), our models are based on the change in earnings. Specifically, it is a 
percentage point change in earnings (PC_EARN) computed as the dollar change in earnings 
divided by the lagged book value of assets. Also, we calculate return on assets (ROA) as earnings 
scaled by the book value of assets, as well as its percentage point change (PC_ROA). Identical 
variables based on the cash flow from operations end with “_CFO”.  
Following Dichev and Tang (2009), we compute the volatilities of earnings and CFO. 
Each volatility is calculated as a rolling 20-quarters standard deviation of ROA or ROA_CFO, 
respectively. In addition, we center earnings/CFO volatility around its industry means to get 
the industry-adjusted volatility (VOL, VOL_CFO). This centering makes regression coefficients 
more intuitive to interpret (Jaccard and Turrisi, 2003; Servaes and Tamayo, 2013). 
As documented by Brooks and Buckmaster (1976), Elgers and Lo (1994), Fama and 
French (2000), and Grullon et al. (2005), profitability is mean reverting. To account for this mean 
reversion (speed of adjustment), we run the following cross-sectional regressions year-by-year for 
every industry (2-digit SIC code). The lagged market-to-book ratio captures firms’ investment 
opportunities and growth stages, while the size is self-explanatory. We take residuals from these 
regressions as proxies for deviations of individual firms’ profitability from its expected industry 
level (DFE, DFE_CFO). ROAi = β0 + β1 ⋅ ROAi,t−1 +  β2 ⋅ MBi,t−1 +  β3 ⋅  SIZEi,t−1 +  ϵi (2.1) 
2.4. Summary and correlation statistics 
In order to pick up potential effects of CSR, Tables 2.1A, 2.1B, and 2.1C compare subsets 
based on the direction of change in the CSR net percentage score. Curiously, when the CSR 
net score rises (Table 1A), the percentage point changes in earnings and CFO are higher on average, 
ROA_CFOi = β0 + β1 ⋅ ROA_CFOi,t−1 +  β2 ⋅ MBi,t−1+  β3 ⋅  SIZEi,t−1 +  ϵi (2.2) 
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and the centered volatilities of earnings and CFO are lower. Meanwhile, the balance sheet profiles 
of the subsets are almost identical, as represented by the means and standard deviations of LEV, 
MB, SIZE. Furthermore, available observations indicate that annual improvements in CSR occur a 
bit less often than deteriorations (37% and 45% of the time), and that constant CSR scores are also 
common (17% of the time). Drilling down, CSR strengths change less frequently than CSR 
concerns (untabulated). Also, increases in CSR strengths are less common than decreases, whereas 
increases in CSR concerns are more frequent than decreases. Moreover, Table 2.1D indicates that 
changes in the CSR net score of the Corporate Governance and Diversity categories are negative 
on average and most scattered compared to other categories. 
Table 2.2A demonstrates that correlations between PC_EARN & PC_CFO, 
DFE & DFE_CFO, and VOL & VOL_CFO are respectively 0.40, 0.45, and 0.46. These suggest 
that earnings and CFO behave independently more than half the time. Therefore, we follow Dichev 
and Tang (2009) and use CFO models in addition to the earnings models. As expected, SIZE is 
negatively correlated with VOL and VOL_CFO (- 0.33). As for correlations among the balance 
sheet variables, MB and LEV are negatively correlated (- 0.27), while SIZE and LEV correlate 
positively (0.33). Other statistically significant correlations in Table 2.2A are either economically 
small or trivial (e.g. DFE and PC_EARN correlate by definition of DFE). Table 2.2B displays that 
changes in the total CSR net percentage score have the highest correlations (more than 0.50) with 
the Corporate Governance, Diversity, and Employee Relations categories. Among the categories, 
the most economically significant correlations (more than 0.10) are between Diversity & Corporate 
Governance and Employee Relations & Community. Moreover, all statistically significant 
correlations between changes in CSR strengths and concerns are economically small (untabulated). 
Finally, Table 2.2C demonstrates that all statistically significant correlations between accounting 
and CSR variables are economically small. Notable correlations are found between 
PC_EARN & PC_CSR (-0.02), VOL_CFO & PC_CSR (- 0.02), SIZE & PC_CSR (0.07), 
PC_EARN & PC_CSR_DIV (-0.04). In addition, MB negatively correlates with the Corporate 
Governance, Community, and Human Rights categories, while SIZE positively correlates with 
changes in all categories except Community and Product. 
[Table 2.1] 
[Table 2.2]  
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
We compare earnings models to CFO models in order to examine the robustness of empirical 
results, as well as to distinguish the accounting and economic factors (Dichev and Tang, 2009). 
In order to examine CSR effects, we treat realized earnings and CFO as proxies for future earnings 
and CFO. Likewise, we proxy future volatility of earnings and CFO with the realized volatility. 
In contrast to Fama and French (2000) and Grullon et al. (2005), we are not using the Fama-
Macbeth two step estimation when dealing with the firm and time effects. Instead, our models are 
estimated using random year effects (feasible generalized least squares, FGLS) and fixed firm 
effects (ordinary least squares, OLS). Furthermore, we cluster standard errors by firm and year in 
order to make them robust to arbitrary correlation structures within firms, years, or both 
(Wooldridge, 2003a; Petersen, 2009; Thompson, 2011; Cameron et al., 2011). Also, we correct 
standard errors for heteroscedasticity (White, 1980; Cribari-Neto, 2004). 
Due to software limits and the number models, using two-way effects (year, firm, and/or 
industry) is impractical. Moreover, firm effects are a stronger control than industry effects. 
Econometric theory (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1999; Baltagi, 2005; Wooldridge, 2010) dictates 
that estimates obtained with the random effects (FGLS) are more efficient. The efficiency is gained 
by assuming independence of the effects (year dummies in our models) from the rest of repressors. 
Following Baltagi (2005), variance in the random year effects models is estimated according to 
Amemiya (1971) instead of Swamy and Arora (1972) in order to avoid negative variance. 
To monitor which estimation method is appropriate and where, we employ three well-known 
specification tests: F test of fixed effects against pooled OLS, Honda’s (1985) Lagrange Multipliers 
test of random effects against pooled OLS, and Hausman test of fixed effects against random effects 
(Davidson and MacKinnon, 1999; Baltagi, 2005; Wooldridge, 2010). For brevity, the specification 
test statistics are not reported.  
3.1. H1: CSR and future changes in earnings/CFO 
Following Fama and French (2000) and Grullon et al. (2005), we construct linear and non-
linear models. To clarify, “linear” models assume linear autocorrelation in earnings/CFO. 
Similarly, the “non-linear” models are not logit or probit regressions, and instead account for the 
mean reversion (speed of adjustment) and the non-linear autocorrelation in earnings/CFO. Overall, 
models of the earnings/CFO changes are divided into four groups: linear models without 
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earnings/CFO volatility, linear models with earnings/CFO volatility, non-linear models without 
earnings/CFO volatility, and non-linear models with earnings/CFO volatility. Also, each model is 
estimated at three horizons, i.e. from one to three years after changes in the CSR net score (El 
Ghoul et al., 2011). There are three earnings models and three CFO models per group (one for 
every horizon). Finally, all models are estimated with two methods: random year effects and fixed 
firm effects. Summing up, we estimate 48 models of changes in earnings/CFO. 
H1A: Linear models PC_EARNt+τ = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝑠𝑠 ⋅  PC_CSRt +  𝜌𝜌 ⋅  PC_EARNt +  𝜋𝜋 ⋅  ROAt + ϵt (3.1) 
 PC_CFOt+τ = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝑠𝑠 ⋅  PC_CSRt +  𝜌𝜌 ⋅  PC_CFOt +  𝜋𝜋 ⋅  ROA_CFOt + ϵt (3.2) 
 
The horizon (year after changes in The CSR net score) is denoted with τ, and we estimate 
models with τ from 1 to 3. PC_STR and PC_CON capture changes in the total percentage scores 
of CSR strengths and concerns; PC_EARN and PC_CFO – the linear autocorrelation in 
earnings/CFO; ROA and ROA_CFO – the profitability. 
𝑠𝑠  is expected to be positive. To elaborate, we expect increases in CSR strengths to be 
associated with future growth in earnings/CFO, while decreases in CSR strengths – with future 
decline in earnings/CFO. Furthermore, we expect negative 𝜌𝜌 – changes in earnings/CFO revert 
from year to year (Fama and French, 2000; Grullon et al., 2005). 𝜋𝜋 is expected to be negative too 
– as firms become more profitable, incremental growth in earnings/CFO diminishes 
(Grullon et al., 2005). 
H1B: Linear models with earnings/CFO volatility PC_EARNt+τ = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝑠𝑠 ⋅  PC_CSRt +  𝜎𝜎 ⋅  VOLt +  𝜎𝜎𝑆𝑆 ⋅  VOLt ⋅  PC_CSRt+  𝜌𝜌 ⋅  PC_EARNt +  𝜋𝜋 ⋅  ROAt +  ϵt (3.3) 
 PC_CFOt+τ = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝑠𝑠 ⋅  PC_CSRt+  𝜎𝜎 ⋅  VOL_CFOt + 𝜎𝜎𝑆𝑆 ⋅  VOL_CFOt ⋅  PC_CSRt+  𝜌𝜌 ⋅  PC_CFOt +  𝜋𝜋 ⋅  ROA_CFOt +  ϵt (3.4) 
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Building upon the previous model group, VOL and VOL_CFO capture the industry-adjusted 
volatility of earnings/CFO. In addition, we study how future changes in earnings/CFO are affected 
by the interaction between the industry-adjusted earnings/CFO volatility and the changes in CSR 
strengths and concerns. To that end, we calculate interaction terms as pairwise products of 
earnings/CFO volatility and changes in CSR strengths and concerns. 
Recall that VOL and VOL_CFO are centered around their industry means. Hence, 𝑠𝑠 is 
interpreted in a slightly different way. Here, it corresponds to the effect of changes in CSR net score 
on future changes in earnings/CFO for the firms with industry-average volatility of earnings/CFO 
(Jaccard and Turrisi, 2003; Servaes and Tamayo, 2013). Again, 𝑠𝑠 is expected to be positive. As for 
the volatility itself, we expect negative 𝜎𝜎, i.e. negative relation between past 5-year volatility and 
future changes in earnings/CFO (Dichev and Tang, 2009). We expect 𝜎𝜎𝑆𝑆 to be negative too. 
In other words, we expect the volatility of earnings/CFO to distort the effects of changes in CSR 
strengths on future changes in earnings/CFO.  
H1A: Non-linear models PC_EARNt+τ = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝑠𝑠 ⋅ PC_CSRt +  𝜇𝜇 ⋅  DFEt +  𝜇𝜇𝑁𝑁 ⋅  N_DFEt+  𝜇𝜇𝑁𝑁2  ⋅  SN_DFEt +  𝜇𝜇𝑃𝑃2  ⋅  SP_DFEt+  𝜌𝜌 ⋅  PC_EARNt +  𝜌𝜌𝐷𝐷 ⋅  DEC_EARNt+ 𝜌𝜌𝐷𝐷2  ⋅  SDEC_EARNt +  𝜌𝜌𝐼𝐼2  ⋅  SINC_EARNt +  ϵt (3.5) 
 PC_CFOt+τ = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝑠𝑠 ⋅ PC_CSRt +  𝜇𝜇 ⋅  DFE_CFOt +  𝜇𝜇𝑁𝑁 ⋅  N_DFE_CFOt+  𝜇𝜇𝑁𝑁2  ⋅  SN_DFE_CFOt +  𝜇𝜇𝑃𝑃2  ⋅  SP_DFE_CFOt+  𝜌𝜌 ⋅  PC_CFOt +  𝜌𝜌𝐷𝐷 ⋅  DEC_CFOt+ 𝜌𝜌𝐷𝐷2  ⋅  SDEC_CFOt +  𝜌𝜌𝐼𝐼2  ⋅  SINC_CFOt +  ϵt (3.6) 
 
Following Fama and French (2000) and Grullon et al. (2005) further, we include the 
following three dummies to capture the mean reversion (speed of adjustment) in earnings. 
N_DFE stands for unexpectedly low profitability and equals negative deviation of ROA from its 
expected industry level and zero otherwise. SN_DFE is the extremely low unexpected profitability 
and equals squared negative DFE and zero otherwise. SP_DFE – extremely high unexpected 
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profitability, equals squared positive DFE and zero otherwise. Note that these dummies are not 
binary. 
Likewise, we account for non-linear autocorrelation in earnings by employing three more 
dummies. DEC_EARN stands for the decrease in earnings as a percentage of lagged assets and 
equals negative PC_EARN and zero otherwise. SDEC_EARN is the extreme decrease in earnings 
as a percentage of lagged assets and equals squared negative PC_EARN and zero otherwise. 
SINC_EARN – extreme increase in earnings as a percentage of lagged assets, equals squared 
positive PC_EARN and zero otherwise. Note that DFE and N_DFE are both included in our 
models, so there is no P_DFE to avoid perfect collinearity in regressors. There is no INC_EARN 
for the same reason. The corresponding names of CFO-based variables end with “_CFO”. 
We expect negative 𝜇𝜇, negative 𝜇𝜇𝑁𝑁, positive 𝜇𝜇𝑁𝑁2, and negative 𝜇𝜇𝑃𝑃2. In other words, we expect 
earnings/CFO to rise faster after experiencing unexpectedly low profitability as opposed to 
unexpectedly high profitability, as well as after experiencing extreme deviations from expected 
profitability as opposed to small deviations (Fama and French, 2000; Grullon et al., 2005). 
As for the non-linear autocorrelation in earnings/CFO, we expect negative 𝜌𝜌, negative 𝜌𝜌𝐷𝐷, positive 
𝜌𝜌𝐷𝐷2, and negative 𝜌𝜌𝐼𝐼2. To clarify, we expect negative changes in earnings/CFO to revert faster than 
positive changes, and large changes to revert faster than small changes (Fama and French, 2000; 
Grullon et al., 2005). 
H1B: Non-linear models with earnings/CFO volatility 
Ultimately, we combine all of the discussed explanatory variables: changes in CSR strengths 
and concerns, earnings/CFO volatility, mean reversion, and autocorrelation terms. Our 
expectations remain the same for all coefficients. PC_EARNt+τ = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝑠𝑠 ⋅ PC_CSRt +  𝜎𝜎 ⋅  VOLt +  𝜎𝜎𝑆𝑆 ⋅  VOLt ⋅  PC_CSRt+  𝜇𝜇 ⋅  DFEt +  𝜇𝜇𝑁𝑁 ⋅  N_DFEt+  𝜇𝜇𝑁𝑁2  ⋅  SN_DFEt +  𝜇𝜇𝑃𝑃2  ⋅  SP_DFEt+  𝜌𝜌 ⋅  PC_EARNt +  𝜌𝜌𝐷𝐷 ⋅  DEC_EARNt+ 𝜌𝜌𝐷𝐷2  ⋅ SDEC_EARNt + 𝜌𝜌𝐼𝐼2  ⋅ SINC_EARNt+ ϵt (3.7) 
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PC_CFOt+τ = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝑠𝑠 ⋅ PC_CSRt+  𝜎𝜎 ⋅  VOL_CFOt +  𝜎𝜎𝑆𝑆 ⋅  VOL_CFOt ⋅  PC_CSRt+  𝜇𝜇 ⋅  DFE_CFOt +  𝜇𝜇𝑁𝑁 ⋅  N_DFE_CFOt+  𝜇𝜇𝑁𝑁2 ⋅  SN_DFE_CFOt +  𝜇𝜇𝑃𝑃2  ⋅ SP_DFE_CFOt+  𝜌𝜌 ⋅  PC_CFOt +  𝜌𝜌𝐷𝐷 ⋅  DEC_CFOt+  𝜌𝜌𝐷𝐷2  ⋅  SDEC_CFOt + 𝜌𝜌𝐼𝐼2 ⋅ SINC_CFOt + ϵt (3.8) 
3.2. H2: Stable and volatile firms 
Following Dichev and Tang (2009), we continue the investigation of the effects of earnings 
volatility. Specifically, we are testing whether CSR effects are different for stable and volatile 
firms. Therefore, we split the volatility term into high- and low-volatility dummy variables. The 
high volatility dummies (HVOL) equal 1 when the volatility is in the top decile (10%) among 
industry peers (2-digit SIC code) and 0 otherwise. Similarly, the low volatility dummies (LVOL) 
take the value of 1 when the volatility is in the bottom decile and 0 otherwise. Consistent with the 
models of changes in earnings described earlier, the models with the high and low volatilities are 
divided into the same groups: linear and non-linear, with random year effects (Year RE) and fixed 
firm effects (Firm FE). Each model is estimated at three horizons. Summing up, we estimate 24 
models of changes in earnings, and 12 models of the earnings volatility.  
H2A: Changes in earnings 
Extended linear and non-linear earnings models are presented below. We expect positive 𝑠𝑠, 
negative 𝜎𝜎𝐻𝐻, and positive 𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿. To clarify, the high volatility is expected to distort the effect of CSR 
on future earnings, whereas the low volatility – to amplify it. Expectations regarding the mean 
reversion and autocorrelation coefficients stay the same, as discussed earlier. Also, we expect 
negative 𝜎𝜎, i.e. higher volatility to be followed by declines in earnings. PC_EARNt+τ = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝑠𝑠 ⋅  PC_CSRt +  𝜎𝜎 ⋅  VOLt  +  𝜎𝜎𝐻𝐻 ⋅  HVOLt ⋅  PC_CSRt +  𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 ⋅  LVOLt ⋅  PC_CSRt+  𝜌𝜌 ⋅  PC_EARNt +  𝜋𝜋 ⋅  ROAt +  ϵt (3.9) 
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PC_EARNt+τ = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝑠𝑠 ⋅ PC_CSRt +  𝜎𝜎 ⋅  VOLt  +  𝜎𝜎𝐻𝐻 ⋅  HVOLt ⋅  PC_CSRt +  𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 ⋅  LVOLt ⋅  PC_CSRt+  𝜇𝜇 ⋅  DFEt +  𝜇𝜇𝑁𝑁 ⋅  N_DFEt+  𝜇𝜇𝑁𝑁2  ⋅  SN_DFEt +  𝜇𝜇𝑃𝑃2  ⋅  SP_DFEt+  𝜌𝜌 ⋅  PC_EARNt +  𝜌𝜌𝐷𝐷 ⋅  DEC_EARNt+ 𝜌𝜌𝐷𝐷2  ⋅ SDEC_EARNt + 𝜌𝜌𝐼𝐼2  ⋅ SINC_EARNt + ϵt (3.10) 
H2B: Volatility of earnings 
Earnings volatility is modelled as follows. There is only one specification, i.e. there are no 
linear or non-linear forms of the model. We expect negative 𝑠𝑠, negative 𝜎𝜎𝐻𝐻, and positive 𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿. 
Specifically, the high volatility is expected to reinforce the effect of CSR on future volatility, while 
the low volatility – to offset it. In addition, we expect positive autocorrelation in volatility 
(positive 𝜎𝜎). Following Campbell et al. (2001) and Pastor and Veronesi (2003), we control for the 
market-to-book ratio, size, and leverage. We expect negative 𝛽𝛽1, i.e. that future earnings of value 
(growth) companies are expected to be stable (volatile). Similarly, we expect negative 𝛽𝛽2, since 
small firms tend to have unstable income. Finally, leverage is supposed to incentivize managers to 




Chapter 4: Empirical results 
While all models include industry dummies, we apply fixed firm effects (Firm FE) and 
random year effects estimators (Year RE). F and LM tests (untabulated) demonstrate that all 
models should include year and firm effects (i.e. pooled OLS is worse). Furthermore, Hausman 
tests (untabulated) reveal that fixed firm effects are better than random firm effects, whereas 
random year effects are better than fixed year effects. Also, a meaningful amount of variability in 
earnings and CFO is captured only in the first year, as indicated by the adjusted R-squared that 
drops sharply at long horizons. 
4.1. H1: CSR and future changes in earnings/CFO 
Tables 4.1-4.4 exhibit how changes in the CSR net score affect future realized changes in 
earnings. Recall that there are four model groups: linear models without earnings volatility (Panel 
A in Tables 4.1 and 4.2), linear models with earnings volatility (Panel B in Tables 4.1 and 4.2), 
non-linear models without earnings volatility (Panel A in Tables 4.3 and 4.4), and non-linear 
models with earnings volatility (Panel B in Tables 4.3 and 4.4). Each model is estimated at three 
horizons (1-3 years after changes in the CSR net score). The results of CFO models are presented 
in Tables 4.5-4.8 and are organized in an identical manner.  
H1: Changes in earnings 
As time passes after changes in the CSR net score, our fixed firm effects models (Tables 
4.1 and 4.3) indicate that the effect on future earnings goes from insignificant (one and two years 
out) to surprisingly negative (three years out). Also at the 3-year horizon, the interaction between 
CSR net score and earnings volatility is negative. Admittedly, there is no evidence if we account 
for the unobserved year effects instead of the firm effects (Tables 4.2 and 4.4). 
In the first two years, CSR effect could be dominated by significant mean reversion and 
autocorrelation in earnings. Consistent with Fama and French (2000), Nissim and Ziv (2001), and 
Grullon et al. (2005), the linear autocorrelation and the effect of profitability are negative as 
expected, while approximately 35%-41% of change in earnings reverts to the mean. Note that linear 
and non-linear models provide identical findings with respect to the CSR effects, so the particular 
form of the earnings mean reversion and autocorrelation is irrelevant. Furthermore, there could be 
an omitted variable or interaction (Jaccard and Turrisi, 2003; Servaes and Tamayo, 2013). 
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Since the firms in our sample operate in a developed capital market (U.S.), other drivers of future 
earnings could be more reliable (Su et al., 2016). Note that time-invariant characteristics are 
already captured by the fixed firm effects (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1999; Baltagi, 2005; 
Wooldridge, 2010). 
In the third year, Hypothesis 1A is rejected. To elaborate, a 100% surge4 in the CSR net score 
is associated with a 5-8%5 decline in earnings three years later. This could manifest the agency 
costs of CSR, as discussed in the literature review (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Schleifer and 
Vishny, 1997; Tirole, 2001; Jensen; 2002). Furthermore, this negative relation could be connected 
to the El Ghoul et al. (2011) argument that socially responsible firms have lower cost of equity. 
The researchers compute implied cost of equity based on the forecasted earnings and stock price, 
so a lower cost of equity could stem from either lower forecasted earnings, higher stock price, or 
both. In contrast, we examine the future realized earnings instead of the forecasted earnings. Also, 
we scale earnings by the book value of assets instead of the stock price. Thus, it would be 
interesting to combine the approaches of Nissim and Ziv (2001), Grullon et al. (2005), and 
El Ghoul et al. (2011), and test how CSR affects forecasted earnings in isolation from the stock 
price dynamics.  
Hypothesis 1B is confirmed at the 3-year horizon. Earnings volatility does negatively 
moderate the effect of CSR changes on future earnings. According to the main CSR coefficient, 
three years after a 100% improvement in the CSR net score, earnings decline by 8% at firms with 
industry-average volatility of earnings. Meanwhile, the interaction term suggests that for a firm 
whose earnings are 1% more stable (less volatile) than its peers, the drop in earnings is less severe 
(higher by 2-3%). We explore the stable and volatile companies in greater detail later, as per 




                                                 
4 E.g., doubling of strengths, elimination of all concerns, or any combination of more strengths and 
less concerns that amounts to a 100% change in the CSR net score. 
5 Ranges include coefficients in all specifications. 
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[Table 4.4] 
H1: Changes in CFO 
Hypothesis 1A is again rejected at the 2-year and 3-year horizons, while there are no findings 
regarding Hypothesis 1B (Tables 4.5 and 4.7). Specifically, a 100% surge in the CSR net score 
is associated with a 1-2% dip in CFO consecutively after two and three years, according to the 
fixed firm effects models. If we account for the unobserved year effects instead of the firm effects 
(Tables 4.6 and 4.8), the only significant result is a negative association at the 2-year horizon. 
In light of the earnings models, the lack of evidence based on CFO is actually a result in 
itself. Recall that one reason to model the cash flow from operations is to isolate macroeconomic 
drivers of firm performance from its accounting factors. Earnings are riddled with accounting 
issues such as mismatches between revenues and expenses, aggressive accrual estimates, earnings 
smoothing behavior, etc. (Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Dichev and Tang, 2008; Dichev and 
Tang, 2009). We see that the main CSR coefficients in the earnings models are larger in absolute 
value than in the CFO models. From this perspective, CSR manifests the quality of financial 
reporting rather than the broad dynamics of the economy/industry. Furthermore, business cycles 
and industrial trends (captured by the CFO volatility) do not reinforce the impact of CSR, unlike 
accounting issues (represented by the earnings volatility). 
Similar to the earnings models, the first year could be inconclusive due to strong mean 
reversion and autocorrelation in CFO, as well as omitted variables or interactions acting as more 
reliable drivers of future CFO (Jaccard and Turrisi, 2003; Servaes and Tamayo, 2013; 
Su et al., 2016). Moreover, the negative long-term relationship could be again connected to 
potential agency costs (Tirole, 2001; Jensen, 2002) or a lower cost of equity (El Ghoul et al., 2011). 
Although it would be interesting to test CSR effects with respect to forecasted CFO in isolation 
from the stock price dynamics, analyst forecasts of CFO could only be available and/or reliable for 






4.2. H2: Stable and volatile firms 
In this section we look at how changes in the CSR net score of stable and volatile firms affect 
the future realized changes in earnings (Tables 4.9 and 4.10) and the future realized volatility of 
earnings (Tables 4.11 and 4.12). As expected, a more nuanced picture is unveiled once we split the 
volatility of earnings into the low volatility dummy (bottom quartile, Panel A) and the high 
volatility dummy (top quartile, Panel B). As discussed earlier, the particular form of the earnings 
mean reversion and autocorrelation is irrelevant. Also, the CFO volatility does not seem to 
attenuate the CSR effect. Therefore, linear models of earnings are sufficient to test Hypotheses 2A 
and 2B. 
H2A: Changes in earnings 
The evidence supporting Hypothesis 2A is weak. Our extended fixed firm effects models 
demonstrate similar main coefficients: the CSR effect on future earnings goes from insignificant 
after one and two years to surprisingly negative three years later. Also at the 3-year horizon, CSR 
does not interact with the low volatility dummy, while negatively interacting with the high 
volatility dummy. To elaborate, a 100% surge (doubling) in the CSR net score of a stable firm leads 
to a 3%6 decline in earnings after three years. Meanwhile, a volatile firm experiences a 10% drop 
in earnings in the same scenario. However, there are again no findings if we account for the 
unobserved year effects instead of the firm effects (Table 4.10). 
[Table 4.9] 
[Table 4.10] 
H2B: Volatility of earnings 
Both fixed firm effects and random year effects models confirm Hypothesis 2B in the first 
two years following changes in the CSR net score (Tables 4.11 and 4.12). To elaborate, a 100% 
improvement in the CSR net score of a volatile firm leads to 2-4% decline in the volatility of 
earnings consecutively after one and two years. Therefore, volatile firms experience a reduction in 
volatility in the first two years after raising the social responsibility, but after three years their 
earnings tend to plunge.  
                                                 
6 Sum of the main coefficient and the dummy interaction 
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Also at the 1-year and 2-year horizons, the negative main CSR coefficient is cancelled out 
by the low volatility interaction terms (-0.01 and 0.01). In other words, stable firms experience no 
escalation in volatility following CSR investments, while having smaller losses after three years 
compared to volatile firms. As for the balance sheet controls, future realized earnings volatility is 
negatively related to the market-to-book ratio and size. As expected, firms with more investment 
opportunities as well as larger companies tend to have lower earnings volatility. 
[Table 4.11] 
[Table 4.12]  
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Chapter 5: Robustness tests 
In this section we examine the reliability of our findings. In particular, we check if CSR 
precedes higher levels of earnings/CFO; how CSR interacts with expenditures on advertising, 
research and development; and whether alternative CSR scores have the same relation to future 
earnings. For brevity, we only discuss linear fixed firm effects models. 
5.1. Levels of earnings/CFO 
Consistent with the methodology and terminology of Nissim and Ziv (2001) and 
Grullon et al. (2005), we model the levels of earnings and CFO. “Levels” are earnings/CFO 
deflated by assets (ROA and ROA_CFO), so, in other words, we are modelling profitability. Tables 
5.1 and 5.2 shows models of earnings and CFO levels, respectively. Based on the earnings and 
CFO levels, we cannot confirm or reject Hypothesis 1A or Hypothesis 1B. Similar to the models 
of changes, CSR effect on levels could be muffled by significant mean reversion and 
autocorrelation in earnings and CFO. Also, other drivers of future profitability and/or interactions 
with CSR could be more reliable (Jaccard and Turrisi, 2003; Servaes and Tamayo, 2013; 
Su et al., 2016).  
Consistent with Fama and French (2000), Nissim and Ziv (2001), and Grullon et al. (2005), 
our models indicate a positive autocorrelation in profitability (from 0.05 to 0.107), as well as 
a negative association with the past changes in profitability (from -0.14 to -0.19). As expected, 
profitability is positively associated with the market-to-book ratio (from 1.87 to 7.68) and 
negatively related to size (from -2.51 to -0.49).  
[Table 5.1] 
[Table 5.2] 
5.1. Advertising and R&D expenditures 
We augment our models with the advertising and research and development (R&D) 
expenditures. Servaes and Tamayo (2013) report a positive interaction between advertising and 
CSR. Their argument is that advertising increases the customer and media awareness of the 
company’s CSR initiatives, and thus facilitates the CSR effect. A similar line of reasoning can be 
                                                 
7 Ranges include coefficients in all specifications. 
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applied to the R&D expenditures. Since companies do not have to disclose immaterial 
expenditures, we substitute missing Compustat data with zeroes8. As final variables, we use the 
percentage point changes in expenditures on advertising and R&D (PC_ADEX and PC_RDEX). 
Table 5.3 presents that the CSR effects are robust to the inclusion of advertising and R&D 
expenditures. There are no associations in the first two years, while the negative relation three years 
later is amplified by the earnings volatility. Moreover, advertising and R&D expenditures do not 
moderate the CSR effect, as all interaction terms are insignificant. 
[Table 5.3] 
5.3. Alternative CSR scores 
It is interesting to see if the CSR effect holds up across categories. We compute three 
alternative measures: conservative CSR, internal CSR, and external CSR (Godfrey et al., 20099; 
Servaes and Tamayo, 2013). The only difference in their calculation is the combination of 
categories: conservative CSR excludes Corporate Governance and Product categories; internal 
CSR includes Diversity and Employee Relations; and external CSR comprises Community, 
Environment, and Human Rights. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Tirole (2001) discuss that 
corporate governance is hardly voluntary for companies, and the same is true for the product 
quality. 
Our findings remain the same with the alternative CSR scores, rejecting Hypothesis 1A and 
confirming Hypothesis 1B (Tables 5.4-5.6). According to the main CSR coefficients, three years 
after a 100% improvement in the CSR net score, earnings decline by 4-8% at firms with industry-
average volatility of earnings. Meanwhile, the interaction term suggests that for a firm whose 
earnings are 1% more stable (less volatile) than its peers, the drop in earnings is less severe (higher 
by 2-3%). Notably, external CSR has a significant negative association with the first year earnings, 
suggesting that the effect on financial performance is more immediate when CSR investments are 
aimed at the external stakeholders. 
[Table 5.4] 
                                                 
8 Servaes and Tamayo (2013) demonstrate that alternative treatments of missing expenditures 
(e.g., using industry averages or trimming) do not affect the relation of CSR to firm performance. 
9 Instead of “internal” and “external”, Godfrey et al., 2009 use the terms “primary” and 






Chapter 6: Limitations and future research 
Like any paper, this one raises more questions than it answers. Here, we outline ways to build 
upon our efforts. As argued by Margolis et al. (2009), researchers can apply an advanced 
methodology and/or test different hypotheses. 
6.1. Advanced methodology 
In order to combat possible endogeneity violation, researchers are encouraged to apply two-
stage sample selection models and instrumental variables (Heckman, 1979; Winship and 
Mare, 1992). To clarify, these models first control whether a firm is likely to invest in CSR, and 
then assess the relationship between CSR and future earnings (Margolis et al., 2009). Since KLD 
scores are clustered around zero, one can run a Tobit regression of CSR on firm characteristics and 
use the residuals in further analysis (Tobin, 1958a).  
Another concern is potential survivorship bias (Dichev and Tang, 2009), as the insignificant 
short-term CSR effect is based on a larger sample than the long-term negative effect. In other 
words, we do not observe firms that were liquidated, acquired, or restructured after they increased 
or decreased CSR. This can be handled with a constant sample approach, i.e. by excluding 
companies that do not have long-term observations. Granted, the constant sample method 
introduces a look-ahead bias.  
More generally, our findings are limited to the U.S. data. While it is possible to make 
inferences regarding corporate social responsibility in comparable developed economies, the use 
of a comprehensive global sample would be a more appropriate solution. For example, Durnev and 
Kim (2005), Khanna et al. (2006), Doidge et al. (2007), Chan and Cheung (2012), Su et al. (2016) 
use Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) corporate governance reports. CLSA data covers large 
companies in ten Asian emerging markets.  
6.2. Different hypotheses 
While we did not distinguish between the investment and signaling hypotheses, it is 
worthwhile to do so. The main difference between them is the anticipation of future performance. 
A proxy for such anticipations could be analyst forecasts obtained from Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S 
or FactSet databases (El Ghoul et al., 2011). In addition to tackling endogeneity, models of CSR 
scores would provide residuals that could be interpreted as unexpected CSR investments. 
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By comparing the effects of expected and unexpected CSR on financial performance, researchers 
could attribute evidence to either the investment or the signaling hypothesis. The agency hypothesis 
should be investigated as well. 
In addition, as argued by Jensen (2002), opposing theories of CSR could be combined into 
an “enlightened” value maximization and stakeholder approach. In other words, governments and 
corporations could augment current practices of corporate governance with the value maximization 
as the “business equivalent of the medical Hippocratic oath” and the creative approach of the 
stakeholder theory. For this to happen, researchers should focus on where, when, and how CSR 
does work. Answers to these questions can come from the perspectives of firms, society, and/or 
institutions (Margolis et al., 2009; Su et al., 2016). Studying single (or different combinations of) 
CSR categories could be fruitful too. 
From the company perspective, researchers can continue investigating the indirect 
mechanisms. Also, since every company/executive at some point contemplates if their goal is 
“to profit or to serve” (Merton, 1976), the natural question is “How to do both efficiently?” 
(Tirole, 2001; Margolis et al., 2009). Hence, research on organizational ambidexterity can shed 
light on how firms could pursue core business and social initiatives simultaneously 
(Raisch et al., 2009; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2013). Moreover, it is intriguing if there are creative 
ways for firms to manage specific categories of CSR. Most of the papers focus on the 
environmental aspect (Margolis et al., 2009). For instance, King and Lenox (2002) argue that 
prevention of pollution is more profitable than pollution treatment. 
From the social standpoint, we can investigate if and when people should rely on CSR, and 
in what form. Hart et al. (1997), Hart (2005), Prahalad (2005), and Seelos and Mair (2005) 
hypothesize that corporations, non-profit organizations, “social entrepreneurs”, and governments 
could team up and implement innovative solutions regarding poverty, infrastructure, public 
services, etc. On the contrary, Jensen (2002) and Reich (2007) assert that CSR in its current form 




Overall, CSR can be studied as an investment, a signaling device, and/or an agency problem. 
In this study, we focus on the investment and signaling hypotheses, and thus study the association 
between CSR and future realized financial performance. Based on a range of fixed firm effects and 
random year effects models, we find no evidence of a short-term (first two years) association 
between CSR and future realized earnings or CFO, but there is a negative long-term (third year) 
relation. The findings are consistent when we control for advertising and R&D expenditures or use 
alternative CSR gauges (conservative, internal, and external CSR). The negative long-term effect 
might be linked to socially responsible firms having agency problems (Tirole, 2001; Jensen, 2002), 
a lower cost of equity (El Ghoul et al., 2011), or both. 
Furthermore, the volatility of earnings negatively moderates the CSR effect on future 
earnings, i.e. it is different for stable and volatile firms. After raising social responsibility, stable 
firms experience no escalation in volatility, while having smaller losses after three years compared 
to volatile firms. In the meantime, volatile firms that engage in CSR tend to have lower volatility 
in the first two years, followed by plunging earnings three years later. Admittedly, when we account 
for the random year effects, the only robust results are that CSR leads to a decline in the cash flow 
from operations, and a lower earnings volatility at volatile companies. Therefore, while our results 
cast doubt whether CSR signals higher earnings or profitability, CSR could signal a lower volatility 
of earnings. 
To build upon our effort, researchers can apply a more advanced methodology and/or ask 
other questions (Margolis et al., 2009). Future efforts should address potential endogeneity 
violations and survivorship biases, as well as try collecting a global sample. While we did not 
distinguish between the investment and signaling hypotheses, it could be done by using analyst 
forecasts and/or splitting CSR into expected and unexpected parts. The agency hypothesis should 
be investigated too. More generally, researchers should continue deciphering where, when, and 
how CSR does work. Answers to these questions could be found from the perspectives of firms, 
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List of variable definitions 
CSR variables (MSCI KLD) 
Identifiers 
 




Name Description/Formula Units/Format 
CUSIP8 8-character CUSIP code Alphanumeric 
YEAR Fiscal year 1991-2015 
CNAME Company name Character 
Name Description/Formula Units/Format 
DOC_STR Total number of documented strengths 
= DOC_STR_COM + DOC_STR_CGOV + 
DOC_STR_DIV + DOC_STR_EMP + 
DOC_STR_ENV + DOC_STR_HUM + 
DOC_STR_PRO 
Integer 
RES_STR Total number of researched strengths 
= RES_STR_COM + RES_STR_CGOV + 
RES_STR_DIV + RES_STR_EMP + RES_STR_ENV 
+ RES_STR_HUM + RES_STR_PRO 
Integer 
STR Total percentage score of CSR strengths 
= 100 * DOC_STR / RES_STR 
% 
high - “good”, low - “bad” 
DOC_CON Total number of documented concerns 
= DOC_CON_COM + DOC_CON_CGOV + 
DOC_CON_DIV + DOC_CON_EMP + 
DOC_CON_ENV + DOC_CON_HUM + 
DOC_CON_PRO 
Integer 
RES_CON Total number of researched concerns 
= RES_CON_COM + RES_CON_CGOV + 
RES_CON_DIV + RES_CON_EMP + 
RES_CON_ENV + RES_CON_HUM + 
RES_CON_PRO 
Integer 
CON Total percentage score of CSR concerns 
= 100 * DOC_CON / RES_CON 
% 
high - “bad”, low - “good” 
CSR Net percentage score  = STR – CON % points 
positive - “good”, negative - “bad” 
PC_CSR Change in the net percentage score = CSR – lag(CSR) % points 
positive - “good”, negative - “bad” 
 41 
Conservative CSR (excluding Corporate Governance and Product) 
  
Name Description/Formula Units/Format 
DOC_STR_XGP Total number of documented strengths 
= DOC_STR_COM + DOC_STR_DIV + 
DOC_STR_EMP + DOC_STR_ENV + 
DOC_STR_HUM 
Integer 
RES_STR_XGP Total number of researched strengths 
= RES_STR_COM + RES_STR_DIV + 
RES_STR_EMP + RES_STR_ENV + 
RES_STR_HUM 
Integer 
STR_XGP Total percentage score of CSR strengths 
= 100 * DOC_STR_XGP / RES_STR_XGP 
% 
high - “good”, low - “bad” 
DOC_CON_XGP Total number of documented concerns 
= DOC_CON_COM + DOC_CON_DIV + 
DOC_CON_EMP + DOC_CON_ENV + 
DOC_CON_HUM 
Integer 
RES_CON_XGP Total number of researched concerns 
= RES_CON_COM + RES_CON_DIV + 
RES_CON_EMP + RES_CON_ENV + 
RES_CON_HUM 
Integer 
CON_XGP Total percentage score of CSR concerns 
= 100 * DOC_CON_XGP / RES_CON_XGP 
% 
high - “bad”, low - “good” 
CSR_XGP Net percentage score  = STR_XGP – CON_XGP % points 
positive - “good”, negative - “bad” 
PC_CSR_XGP Change in the net percentage score  
= CSR_XGP – lag(CSR_XGP) 
% points 
positive - “good”, negative - “bad” 
 42 
Internal CSR (Diversity and Employee Relations) 
 
External CSR (community, Environment, Human Rights) 
 
  
Name Description/Formula Units/Format 
DOC_STR_INTER Total number of documented strengths 
= DOC_STR_DIV + DOC_STR_EMP 
Integer 
RES_STR_INTER Total number of researched strengths 
= RES_STR_DIV + RES_STR_EMP 
Integer 
STR_INTER Total percentage score of CSR strengths 
= 100 * DOC_STR_INTER / RES_STR_INTER 
% 
high - “good”, low - “bad” 
DOC_CON_INTER Total number of documented concerns 
= DOC_CON_DIV + DOC_CON_EMP 
Integer 
RES_CON_INTER Total number of researched concerns 
= RES_CON_DIV + RES_CON_EMP 
Integer 
CON_INTER Total percentage score of CSR concerns 
= 100 * DOC_CON_INTER / RES_CON_INTER 
% 
high - “bad”, low - “good” 
CSR_INTER Net percentage score  
 = STR_INTER  – CON_INTER 
% points 
positive - “good”, negative - “bad” 
PC_CSR_INTER Change in the net percentage score  
= CSR_INTER  – lag(CSR_INTER) 
% points 
positive - “good”, negative - “bad” 
Name Description/Formula Units/Format 
DOC_STR_EXTER Total number of documented strengths 
= DOC_STR_COM + DOC_STR_ENV + 
DOC_STR_HUM 
Integer 
RES_STR_EXTER Total number of researched strengths 
= RES_STR_COM + RES_STR_ENV + 
RES_STR_HUM 
Integer 
STR_EXTER Total percentage score of CSR strengths 
= 100 * DOC_STR_EXTER / RES_STR_EXTER 
% 
high - “good”, low - “bad” 
DOC_CON_EXTER Total number of documented concerns 
= DOC_CON_COM + DOC_CON_ENV + 
DOC_CON_HUM 
Integer 
RES_CON_EXTER Total number of researched concerns 
= RES_CON_COM + RES_CON_ENV + 
RES_CON_HUM 
Integer 
CON_EXTER Total percentage score of CSR concerns 
= 100 * DOC_CON_EXTER  / RES_CON_EXTER 
% 
high - “bad”, low - “good” 
CSR_EXTER Net percentage score  
= STR_EXTER  – CON_EXTER 
% points 
positive - “good”, negative - “bad” 
PC_CSR_EXTER Change in the net percentage score  
= CSR_EXTER – lag(CSR_EXTER) 
% points 
positive - “good”, negative - “bad” 
 43 
Community, Corporate Governance 
  
Name Description/Formula Units/Format 
STR_COM_[A-X] Strength indicators in the Community category 1 – met criteria - “good” 
0 – did not meet criteria - “bad” 
R, NA – unresearched, not available 
DOC_STR_COM Number of documented strengths in a given year (ones) Integer 
RES_STR_COM Number of researched strengths in a given year (ones and 
zeroes) 
Integer 
STR_COM Percentage score of strengths in the Community category 
= 100 * DOC_STR_COM / RES_STR_COM 
% 
high - “good”, low - “bad” 
CON_COM_[A-X] Concern indicators in the Community category 1 – met criteria - “bad” 
0 – did not meet criteria - “good” 
R, NA – unresearched, not available 
DOC_CON_COM Number of documented concerns in a given year (ones)  Integer 
RES_CON_COM Number of researched concerns in a given year (ones and 
zeroes)  
Integer 
CON_COM Percentage score of concerns in the Community category 
= 100 * DOC_CON_COM / RES_CON_COM 
% 
high - “bad”, low - “good” 
CSR_COM Net percentage score  = STR_COM – CON_COM % points 
positive - “good”, negative - “bad” 
PC_CSR_COM Change in the net percentage score  
= CSR_COM – lag(CSR_COM) 
% points 
positive - “good”, negative - “bad” 
   
STR_CGOV_[A-X] Strength indicators in the Corporate Governance category 1 – met criteria - “good” 
0 – did not meet criteria - “bad” 
R, NA – unresearched, not available 
DOC_STR_CGOV Number of documented strengths in a given year (ones)  Integer 
RES_STR_CGOV Number of researched strengths in a given year (ones and 
zeroes)  
Integer 
STR_CGOV Percentage score of strengths in the Corporate 
Governance cat. 
= 100 * DOC_STR_CGOV / RES_STR_CGOV 
% 
high - “good”, low - “bad” 
CON_CGOV_[A-
X] 
Concern indicators in the Corporate Governance category 1 – met criteria - “bad” 
0 – did not meet criteria - “good” 
R, NA – unresearched, not available 
DOC_CON_CGOV Number of documented concerns in a given year (ones)  Integer 
RES_CON_CGOV Number of researched concerns in a given year (ones and 
zeroes) 
Integer 
CON_CGOV Percentage score of concerns in the Corporate 
Governance cat. 
= 100 * DOC_CON_CGOV / RES_CON_CGOV 
% 
high - “bad”, low - “good” 
CSR_CGOV Net percentage score  = STR_CGOV – CON_CGOV % points 
positive - “good”, negative - “bad” 
PC_CSR_CGOV Change in the net percentage score  
= CSR_CGOV – lag(CSR_CGOV) 
% points 
positive - “good”, negative - “bad” 
 44 
Diversity, Employee Relations 
  
Name Description/Formula Units/Format 
STR_DIV_[A-X] Strength indicators in the Diversity category 1 – met criteria - “good” 
0 – did not meet criteria - “bad” 
R, NA – unresearched, not available 
DOC_STR_DIV Number of documented strengths in a given year (ones) Integer 
RES_STR_DIV Number of researched strengths in a given year (ones 
and zeroes) 
Integer 
STR_DIV Percentage score of strengths in the Diversity category 
= 100 * DOC_STR_DIV / RES_STR_DIV 
% 
high - “good”, low - “bad” 
CON_DIV_[A-X] Concern indicators in the Diversity category 1 – met criteria - “bad” 
0 – did not meet criteria - “good” 
R, NA – unresearched, not available 
DOC_CON_DIV Number of documented concerns in a given year (ones)  Integer 
RES_CON_DIV Number of researched concerns in a given year (ones 
and zeroes) 
Integer 
CON_DIV Percentage score of concerns in the Diversity category 
= 100 * DOC_CON_DIV / RES_CON_DIV 
% 
high - “bad”, low - “good” 
CSR_DIV Net percentage score  = STR_DIV – CON_DIV % points 
positive - “good”, negative - “bad” 
PC_CSR_DIV Change in the net percentage score  
= CSR_DIV – lag(CSR_DIV) 
% points 
positive - “good”, negative - “bad” 
   
STR_EMP_[A-X] Strength indicators in the Employee Relations category 1 – met criteria - “good” 
0 – did not meet criteria - “bad” 
R, NA – unresearched, not available 
DOC_STR_EMP Number of documented strengths in a given year (ones) Integer 
RES_STR_EMP Number of researched strengths in a given year (ones 
and zeroes)  
Integer 
STR_EMP Percentage score of strengths in the Employee 
Relations category 
= 100 * DOC_STR_EMP / RES_STR_EMP 
% 
high - “good”, low - “bad” 
CON_EMP_[A-X] Concern indicators in the Employee Relations category 1 – met criteria - “bad” 
0 – did not meet criteria - “good” 
R, NA – unresearched, not available 
DOC_CON_EMP Number of documented concerns in a given year (ones)  Integer 
RES_CON_EMP Number of researched concerns in a given year (ones 
and zeroes) 
Integer 
CON_EMP Percentage score of concerns in the Employee 
Relations category 
= 100 * DOC_CON_EMP / RES_CON_EMP 
% 
high - “bad”, low - “good” 
CSR_EMP Net percentage score  = STR_EMP – CON_EMP % points 
positive - “good”, negative - “bad” 
PC_CSR_EMP Change in the net percentage score  
= CSR_EMP – lag(CSR_EMP) 
% points 
positive - “good”, negative - “bad” 
 45 
Environment, Human Rights 
 
  
Name Description/Formula Units/Format 
STR_ENV_[A-X] Strength indicators in the Environment category 1 – met criteria - “good” 
0 – did not meet criteria - “bad” 
R, NA – unresearched, not available 
DOC_STR_ENV Number of documented strengths in a given year (ones) Integer 
RES_STR_ENV Number of researched strengths in a given year (ones and 
zeroes) 
Integer 
STR_ENV Percentage score of strengths in the Environment category 
= 100 * DOC_STR_ENV / RES_STR_ENV 
% 
high - “good”, low - “bad” 
CON_ENV_[A-X] Concern indicators in the Environment category 1 – met criteria - “bad” 
0 – did not meet criteria - “good” 
R, NA – unresearched, not available 
DOC_CON_ENV Number of documented concerns in a given year (ones)  Integer 
RES_CON_ENV Number of researched concerns in a given year (ones and 
zeroes) 
Integer 
CON_ENV Percentage score of concerns in the Environment category 
= 100 * DOC_CON_ENV / RES_CON_ENV 
% 
high - “bad”, low - “good” 
CSR_ENV Net percentage score  = STR_ENV – CON_ENV % points 
positive - “good”, negative - “bad” 
PC_CSR_ENV Change in the net percentage score  
= CSR_ENV – lag(CSR_ENV) 
% points 
positive - “good”, negative - “bad” 
   
STR_HUM_[A-X] Strength indicators in the Human Rights category 1 – met criteria - “good” 
0 – did not meet criteria - “bad” 
R, NA – unresearched, not available 
DOC_STR_HUM Number of documented strengths in a given year (ones) Integer 
RES_STR_HUM Number of researched strengths in a given year (ones and 
zeroes) 
Integer 
STR_HUM Percentage score of strengths in the Human Rights 
category 
= 100 * DOC_STR_HUM / RES_STR_HUM 
% 
high - “good”, low - “bad” 
CON_HUM_[A-
X] 
Concern indicators in the Human Rights category 1 – met criteria - “bad” 
0 – did not meet criteria - “good” 
R, NA – unresearched, not available 
DOC_CON_HUM Number of documented concerns in a given year (ones)  Integer 
RES_CON_HUM Number of researched concerns in a given year (ones and 
zeroes) 
Integer 
CON_HUM Percentage score of concerns in the Human Rights 
category 
= 100 * DOC_CON_HUM / RES_CON_HUM 
% 
high - “bad”, low - “good” 
CSR_HUM Net percentage score  = STR_HUM – CON_HUM % points 
positive - “good”, negative - “bad” 
PC_CSR_HUM Change in the net percentage score  
= CSR_HUM – lag(CSR_HUM) 
% points 





Name Description/Formula Units/Format 
STR_PRO_[A-X] Strength indicators in the Product category 1 – met criteria - “good” 
0 – did not meet criteria - “bad” 
R, NA – unresearched, not available 
DOC_STR_PRO Number of documented strengths in a given year (ones) Integer 
RES_STR_PRO Number of researched strengths in a given year (ones 
and zeroes) 
Integer 
STR_PRO Percentage score of strengths in the Product category 
= 100 * DOC_STR_PRO / RES_STR_PRO 
% 
high - “good”, low - “bad” 
CON_PRO_[A-X] Concern indicators in the Product category 1 – met criteria - “bad” 
0 – did not meet criteria - “good” 
R, NA – unresearched, not available 
DOC_CON_PRO Number of documented concerns in a given year (ones)  Integer 
RES_CON_PRO Number of researched concerns in a given year (ones 
and zeroes) 
Integer 
CON_PRO Percentage score of concerns in the Product category 
= 100 * DOC_CON_PRO / RES_CON_PRO 
% 
high - “bad”, low - “good” 
CSR_PRO Net percentage score  = STR_PRO – CON_PRO % points 
positive - “good”, negative - “bad” 
PC_CSR_PRO Change in the net percentage score  
= CSR_PRO – lag(CSR_PRO) 
% points 
positive - “good”, negative - “bad” 
 47 
Accounting variables (Compustat) 
Identifiers 
 
Balance sheet and expenditures 
 
  
Name Description/Formula Units/Format 
CUSIP8 8-character CUSIP code Alphanumeric 
YEAR Fiscal year 1991-2015 
CNAME Company name Character 
   
SIC2 2-digit SIC code Character (“01”-“99”) 
SIC2T Title of the 2-digit SIC code Character 
   
PRICE Close stock price as of the fiscal year end 
Original name in Compustat - prcc_f 
USD 
SHARES Number of common shares outstanding 
Original name in Compustat - csho 
Millions 
Name Description/Formula Units/Format 
ASSETS Book value of assets  
at in Compustat 
USD millions 
BEQ Book value of equity  
ceq in Compustat 
USD millions 
LIAB Book value of liabilities 
lt in Compustat 
USD millions 
DEBT Book value of long-term debt  
dltt in Compustat 
USD millions 
LEV Leverage = 100 * DEBT / ASSETS % 
MEQ Market value of equity as of the fiscal year end  
= PRICE * SHARES 
USD millions 
MB Market-to-book ratio, a proxy for Tobin’s Q  
= log( (MEQ + LIAB) / ASSETS ) 
(Fama and French, 2000)  
Natural log  
SIZE Natural logarithm of assets = log(ASSETS) Natural log 
   
PC_ADEX Percentage point change in the advertising expenditures 
= ADEX / SALES – lag(ADEX / SALES) 
% points 
PC_RDEX Percentage point change in the expenditures on research and 
development. 
= RDEX / ASSETS – lag(RDEX / ASSETS) 
% points 
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Earnings/CFO profitability and volatility 
 
  
Name Description/Formula Units/Format 
EARN Earnings before extraordinary items 
ibc in Compustat 
USD millions 
PC_EARN Percentage point change in earnings (dollar change scaled by lagged 
assets) 
= 100 * (EARN - lag(EARN)) / lag(ASSETS) 
(Fama and French, 2000; Grullon et. al, 2005) 
% 
ROA Return on assets = 100 * EARN / ASSETS 
(Fama and French, 2000) 
% 
PC_ROA Percentage point change in return on assets 
 = ROA – lag(ROA) 
(Fama and French, 2000; Grullon et al., 2005) 
% points 
DFE ROA’s deviation from its expected value.  
The expected ROA is estimated with cross-sectional regressions: 
ROA ~ lag(ROA) + lag(SIZE) + lag(MB) 
DFE = ROA – E(ROA) 
(Fama and French, 2000)  
% points 
VOL Earnings volatility centered around industry means 
= rolling 20-quarters standard deviation of ROA – average of the 
respective industry  
(Dichev and Tang, 2009) 
% 
positive – “bad”  
negative – “good” 
   
CFO Cash flow from operations 
oancf in Compustat 
USD millions 
PC_CFO Percentage point change in cash flow from operations (dollar change 
scaled by lagged assets) 
= 100 * (CFO - lag(CFO)) / lag(ASSETS) 
(Fama and French, 2000; Grullon et. al, 2005) 
% 
ROA_CFO Return on assets based on the cash flow from operations 
= 100 * CFO / ASSETS 
% 
PC_ROA_CFO Percentage point change in return on assets based on cash flow from 
operations 
= ROA_CFO – lag(ROA_CFO) 
% points 
DFE_CFO ROA_CFO’s deviation from its expected value. The expected 
ROA_CFO is estimated with cross-sectional regressions: 
ROA_CFO ~ lag(ROA_CFO) + lag(SIZE) + lag(MB) 
DFE_CFO = ROA_CFO – E(ROA_CFO) 
(Fama and French, 2000)  
% points 
VOL_CFO CFO volatility centered around industry means) 
= rolling 20-quarters standard deviation of ROA_CFO – average of 
the respective industry 
(Dichev and Tang, 2009) 
% 
positive – “bad”  
negative – “good” 
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Dummy variables and interaction terms 
 
Name Description/Formula Units/Format 
VOL * PC_CSR 
(VOL_CFO * 
PC_CSR) 
Centered earnings (CFO) volatility * Change in the CSR net 
percentage score 
% points squared 
   
HVOL 
(HVOL_CFO) 
HVOL takes the value of 1 when VOL is in the top decile (10%) 
among industry peers (2-digit SIC code) 
%  
Positive by definition 




LVOL takes the value of 1 when VOL is in the bottom decile (10%) 
among industry peers (2-digit SIC code) 
% 
Negative by definition 
high – “good”, low – 
“bad” 
   
N_DFE 
(N_DFE_CFO) 
Unexpectedly low profitability 
= Negative deviation of ROA from its expected industry level and 0 
otherwise.  
The deviation is the residual from cross-sectional regressions (see 
DFE). 




Extremely low unexpected profitability 
= Squared negative deviation of ROA from its expected industry level 
and 0 otherwise.  
The deviation is the residual from cross-sectional regressions (see 
DFE). 
(Fama and French, 2000; Grullon et al., 2005) 
% points squared 
SP_DFE 
(SP_DFE_CFO) 
Extremely high unexpected profitability 
= Squared positive deviation of ROA from its expected industry level 
and 0 otherwise.  
The deviation is the residual from cross-sectional regressions (see 
DFE). 
(Fama and French, 2000; Grullon et al., 2005) 
% points squared 
   
DEC_EARN 
(DEC_CFO) 
Decrease in earnings (CFO) as a percentage of lagged assets 
= negative PC_EARN (PC_CFO) and 0 otherwise 




Extreme decrease in earnings (CFO) as a percentage of lagged assets 
= squared negative PC_EARN (PC_CFO) and 0 otherwise 
(Fama and French, 2000; Grullon et al., 2005) 
% points squared 
SINC_EARN 
(SINC_CFO) 
Extreme increase in earnings (CFO) as a percentage of lagged assets 
= squared positive PC_EARN (PC_CFO) and 0 otherwise 
(Fama and French, 2000; Grullon et al., 2005) 
% points squared 
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Summary and correlation statistics 
Table 2.1: Summary statistics 
 Mean SD 5th pctl. Median 95th pctl. Obs. 
A. Increases in CSR net percentage score (PC_CSR > 0) 
PC_EARN 0.83% 9.19% -10.83% 0.81% 11.54% 7,404 
PC_CFO 1.32% 8.18% -9.10% 0.99% 12.62% 7,404 
DFE 0.10% 6.68% -8.59% 0.16% 7.87% 7,380 
DFE_CFO 0.06% 5.85% -7.68% 0.00% 8.01% 7,380 
VOL -1.17% 2.49% -3.93% -1.39% 2.53% 7,185 
VOL_CFO -1.12% 2.29% -3.58% -1.54% 2.64% 7,185 
LEV 17.77% 16.05% 0.00% 15.66% 48.01% 7,379 
MB 0.63 0.51 -0.04 0.54 1.63 7,388 
SIZE 7.53 1.59 5.14 7.43 10.34 7,404 
B. Decreases in CSR net percentage score (PC_CSR < 0) 
PC_EARN 0.72% 10.56% -13.53% 0.81% 13.69% 8,973 
PC_CFO 1.00% 8.83% -11.02% 0.84% 12.82% 8,973 
DFE 0.00% 7.78% -10.20% 0.22% 9.23% 8,940 
DFE_CFO 0.02% 6.23% -8.48% 0.00% 8.34% 8,940 
VOL -0.97% 2.70% -3.85% -1.31% 3.25% 8,711 
VOL_CFO -1.00% 2.34% -3.45% -1.46% 2.92% 8,711 
LEV 17.55% 16.46% 0.00% 15.43% 49.03% 8,935 
MB 0.57 0.50 -0.09 0.49 1.54 8,941 
SIZE 7.31 1.56 5.00 7.19 10.12 8,973 
C. No change in CSR net percentage score (PC_CSR = 0) 
PC_EARN 1.17% 11.97% -13.44% 0.56% 17.08% 3,454 
PC_CFO 1.21% 8.81% -10.66% 0.73% 13.96% 3,454 
DFE 0.04% 7.59% -11.40% 0.29% 9.07% 3,444 
DFE_CFO 0.03% 6.47% -8.77% 0.00% 9.17% 3,444 
VOL -0.87% 2.60% -3.72% -1.21% 3.21% 3,349 
VOL_CFO -0.80% 2.46% -3.29% -1.30% 3.36% 3,349 
LEV 17.09% 16.93% 0.00% 14.24% 49.88% 3,441 
MB 0.56 0.48 -0.07 0.46 1.47 3,442 
SIZE 6.92 1.35 4.87 6.82 9.32 3,454 
D. CSR net percentage score (total and by category) 
PC_CSR 0.57% 7.81% -9.53% 0% 15% 19831 
PC_CSR_CGOV -0.99% 24.3% -33.33% 0% 33.33% 16377 
PC_CSR_COM 0.08% 16.58% -8.33% 0% 0% 17014 
PC_CSR_DIV -0.64% 21.8% -33.33% 0% 33.33% 17283 
PC_CSR_EMP 0.62% 13.81% -20% 0% 20% 19691 
PC_CSR_ENV 0.61% 10.64% -14.29% 0% 16.67% 19827 
PC_CSR_HUM 0.45% 9.62% 0% 0% 0% 14890 
PC_CSR_PRO 0.62% 17.45% -20% 0% 25% 17922 
Note. – Accounting variables are sourced from the Compustat Monthly Updates North America Fundamentals Annual and Quarterly databases, 
and merged with CSR variables from the MSCI ESG KLD STATS database from 1991 to 2015. PC_CSR – change in the CSR net percentage 
score. PC_EARN is the percentage point change in earnings before extraordinary items (dollar change scaled by the lagged book value of assets). 
PC_CFO is the percentage point change in cash flow from operations (dollar change scaled by the lagged book value of assets). 
ROA is earnings before extraordinary items scaled by the book value of assets. ROA_CFO is cash flow from operations scaled by the book value 
of assets. DFE and DFE_CFO are deviations of ROA and ROA_CFO from their expected values (estimated with cross-sectional regressions of 
ROA or ROA_CFO on lagged ROA or ROA_CFO, MB, and SIZE). VOL is the earnings volatility centered around industry means (rolling 20-
quarters standard deviation of ROA). VOL_CFO is the CFO volatility centered around industry means (rolling 20-quarters standard deviation of 
ROA_CFO). LEV is the book value of long-term debt scaled by the book value of assets. MB is the market-to-book ratio (natural logarithm of the 
sum of the market value of equity and the book value of liabilities scaled by the book value of assets). SIZE is the natural logarithm of 
the book value of assets. CGOV – Corporate Governance category, COM – Community category, DIV – Diversity category, EMP – Employee 
Relations category, ENV – Environment category, HUM – Human Rights category, PRO – Product category. 
 
 Table 2.2: Correlation statistics 
A. Accounting variables  
PC_EARN PC_CFO DFE DFE_CFO VOL VOL_CFO LEV MB 
PC_CFO 0.4***        
DFE 0.65*** 0.3***       
DFE_CFO 0.28*** 0.71*** 0.45***      
VOL 0.09*** 0.03*** -0.1*** -0.04***     
VOL_CFO 0.05*** 0.05*** 0 -0.01 0.46***    
LEV -0.05*** -0.03*** -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.14***   
MB 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.04*** 0.07*** 0.03*** 0.12*** -0.27***  
SIZE -0.02*** -0.01 0.02*** 0 -0.33*** -0.33*** 0.33*** -0.15*** 
B. CSR variables 
 PC_CSR PC_CSR_CGOV PC_CSR_COM PC_CSR_DIV PC_CSR_EMP PC_CSR_ENV PC_CSR_HUM  
PC_CSR_CGOV 0.56***        
PC_CSR_COM 0.32*** 0.07***       
PC_CSR_DIV 0.51*** 0.12*** 0.04***      
PC_CSR_EMP 0.49*** 0.01* 0.11*** 0.02***     
PC_CSR_ENV 0.38*** 0.06*** 0.02** 0 0.01**    
PC_CSR_HUM 0.28*** 0.1*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.06***   
PC_CSR_PRO 0.34*** 0.04*** 0.09*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.1***  
C. Accounting and CSR variables 
 PC_CSR PC_CSR_CGOV PC_CSR_COM PC_CSR_DIV PC_CSR_EMP PC_CSR_ENV PC_CSR_HUM PC_CSR_PRO 
PC_EARN -0.02*** 0 0 -0.04*** 0 0.01** -0.01 0 
PC_CFO 0 0 0 0.01 0 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
DFE 0.01* 0.01 0 0.01 0 0 0.01 0.01 
DFE_CFO 0.01 -0.01 0 0.01* 0 0.01 -0.01 0 
VOL -0.01* -0.03*** 0 0 0 -0.01* -0.01 -0.01 
VOL_CFO -0.02*** -0.03*** 0 0 -0.01* -0.02*** -0.01 -0.01 
LEV 0.01 0.03*** -0.01 0.01* -0.01 0 0 0 
MB 0 -0.02** -0.02** -0.01 0 0.01 -0.02*** -0.01 
SIZE 0.07*** 0.08*** -0.01 0.05*** 0.02** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.01 
Note. – Accounting variables are sourced from the Compustat Monthly Updates North America Fundamentals Annual and Quarterly databases, and merged with CSR variables from 
the MSCI ESG KLD STATS database. PC_EARN is the percentage point change in earnings before extraordinary items (dollar change scaled by the lagged book value of assets). 
PC_CFO is the percentage point change in cash flow from operations (dollar change scaled by the lagged book value of assets). ROA is earnings before extraordinary items scaled by 
the book value of assets. ROA_CFO is cash flow from operations scaled by the book value of assets. DFE and DFE_CFO are deviations of ROA and ROA_CFO from their expected 
values (estimated with cross-sectional regressions of ROA or ROA_CFO on lagged ROA or ROA_CFO, MB, and SIZE). VOL is the earnings volatility centered around industry 
means (rolling 20-quarters standard deviation of ROA). VOL_CFO is the CFO volatility centered around industry means (rolling 20-quarters standard deviation of ROA_CFO). 
LEV is the book value of long-term debt scaled by the book value of assets. MB is the market-to-book ratio (natural logarithm of the sum of the market value of equity and book 
value of liabilities scaled by the book value of assets). SIZE is the natural logarithm of the book value of assets. PC_CSR – change in the CSR net percentage score. 
CGOV – Corporate Governance category, COM – Community category, DIV – Diversity category, EMP – Employee Relations category, ENV – Environment category, 




H1: Changes in earnings 
Table 4.1: H1 - Linear models of changes in earnings (fixed firm effects) 
 Dependent variable – PC_EARN 
 A. Without volatility B. With volatility 
 𝛕𝛕 = 1 𝛕𝛕 = 2 𝛕𝛕 = 3 𝛕𝛕 = 1 𝛕𝛕 = 2 𝛕𝛕 = 3 
PC_CSR -0.02 -0.005 -0.05** -0.02 -0.01 -0.08*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
       
VOL    0.39** -0.28 -0.62** 
    (0.19) (0.37) (0.30) 
       
VOL * PC_CSR    -0.003 0.001 -0.03** 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
       
PC_EARN 0.02 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 -0.04 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
       
ROA -0.76*** -0.19*** -0.02 -0.74*** -0.20*** -0.04 
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Method Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE 
Clustered F-stat 166.7*** 30.15*** 2.71** 156.2*** 18.15*** 5.86*** 
Observations 17,338 14,845 12,705 16,806 14,366 12,274 
Adjusted R2 0.22 -0.13 -0.17 0.22 -0.13 -0.16 
Note. – *p-value < 0.10 **p-value < 0.05 ***p-value < 0.01. All models are estimated with OLS 
(fixed firm effects, within estimator). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by firm 
and year, as well as corrected for heteroscedasticity. PC_EARN is the percentage point change 
in earnings before extraordinary items (dollar change scaled by the lagged book value of 
assets). PC_CSR – change in the CSR net percentage score. ROA is earnings before 
extraordinary items scaled by the book value of assets. VOL is the earnings volatility centered 




Table 4.2: H1 - Linear models of changes in earnings (random year effects) 
 Dependent variable – PC_EARN 
 A. Without volatility B. With volatility 
 𝛕𝛕 = 1 𝛕𝛕 = 2 𝛕𝛕 = 3 𝛕𝛕 = 1 𝛕𝛕 = 2 𝛕𝛕 = 3 
PC_CSR -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.06) 
       
VOL    -0.05 0.03 -0.04 
    (0.11)  (0.12) 
       
VOL * PC_CSR    -0.004 0.002 -0.01 
    (0.01) (0.003) (0.01) 
       
PC_EARN -0.11*** -0.04*** 0.0003 -0.11*** -0.05*** 0.001 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
       
ROA -0.28*** -0.07*** -0.02 -0.28*** -0.07*** -0.03 
 (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) 
       
CONSTANT 1.52 0.32 0.51 1.56 0.42 0.46 
 (1.13) (0.95) (34.06) (1.27) (1.06) (35.95) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Method Year RE Year RE Year RE Year RE Year RE Year RE 
Clustered F-stat -16.62 0.77 -0.54 -5.92 -3.11 0.66 
Observations 17,338 14,845 12,705 16,806 14,366 12,274 
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.01 -0.002 0.12 0.01 -0.002 
Note. – *p-value < 0.10 **p-value < 0.05 ***p-value < 0.01. All models are estimated with 
FGLS (random year effects). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by firm and year, 
as well as corrected for heteroscedasticity. PC_EARN is the percentage point change in 
earnings before extraordinary items (dollar change scaled by the lagged book value of 
assets). PC_CSR – change in the CSR net percentage score. ROA is earnings before 
extraordinary items scaled by the book value of assets. VOL is the earnings volatility 
centered around industry means (rolling 20-quarters standard deviation of ROA). 
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Table 4.3: H1 - Non-linear models of changes in earnings (fixed firm effects) 
 Dependent variable – PC_EARN 
 A. Without volatility B. With volatility 
 𝛕𝛕 = 1 𝛕𝛕 = 2 𝛕𝛕 = 3 𝛕𝛕 = 1 𝛕𝛕 = 2 𝛕𝛕 = 3 
PC_CSR -0.02 -0.01 -0.05** -0.02 -0.02 -0.08*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
       
VOL    0.47** -0.18 -0.58* 
    (0.20) (0.33) (0.30) 
       
VOL * PC_CSR    -0.002 -0.003 -0.02** 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
       
DFE -0.40*** 0.16 0.08 -0.41*** 0.16 0.07 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.13) (0.12) (0.10) 
       
N_DFE -0.10 -0.23* -0.02 -0.09 -0.23* -0.02 
 (0.17) (0.12) (0.13) (0.17) (0.13) (0.12) 
       
SN_DFE 0.01*** -0.001 0.003 0.01*** -0.001 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
       
SP_DFE 0.0002 -0.01 -0.01 0.0000 -0.01 -0.005 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
       
PC_EARN 0.28*** -0.08 -0.09 0.26*** -0.07 -0.07 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) 
       
DEC_EARN -0.62*** -0.14* -0.07 -0.56*** -0.16* -0.12* 
 (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.09) (0.08) 
       
SDEC_EARN -0.003 -0.002 -0.01*** -0.003 -0.002 -0.01*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
       
SINC_EARN -0.004*** 0.0001 0.001 -0.004*** -0.0000 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Method Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE 
Clustered F-stat -15145 7.17*** -3.67 -349.53 6.57*** 3.04*** 
Observations 17,275 14,789 12,662 16,748 14,315 12,234 
Adjusted R2 0.10 -0.15 -0.16 0.11 -0.15 -0.16 
Note. – *p-value < 0.10 **p-value < 0.05 ***p-value < 0.01. All models are estimated with OLS 
(fixed firm effects, within estimator). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by firm and 
year, as well as corrected for heteroscedasticity. PC_EARN is the percentage point change in 
earnings before extraordinary items (dollar change scaled by the lagged book value of assets). 
PC_CSR – change in the CSR net percentage score. ROA is earnings before extraordinary items 
scaled by the book value of assets. VOL is the earnings volatility centered around industry 
means (rolling 20-quarters standard deviation of ROA). DFE is the deviation of ROA from its 
expected value (estimated with cross-sectional regressions of ROA on lagged ROA, MB, and 
SIZE). N_DFE (P_DFE) is the negative (positive) value of DFE. DEC_EARN (INC_EARN) 
stands for percentage point decrease (increase) in earnings. Prefix S stands for squared terms. 
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Table 4.4: H1 - Non-linear models of changes in earnings (random year effects) 
 Dependent variable – PC_EARN 
 A. Without volatility B. With volatility 
 𝛕𝛕 = 1 𝛕𝛕 = 2 𝛕𝛕 = 3 𝛕𝛕 = 1 𝛕𝛕 = 2 𝛕𝛕 = 3 
PC_CSR -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01) (0.07) 
       
VOL    -0.10 0.02 -0.002 
    (0.09)  (0.16) 
       
VOL * PC_CSR    0.001 0.002 -0.01 
    (0.01) (0.004) (0.01) 
       
DFE -0.34*** -0.02 0.03 -0.34*** -0.01 0.02 
 (0.13) (0.09) (0.14) (0.13) (0.09) (0.15) 
       
N_DFE 0.12 -0.04 -0.08 0.11 -0.05 -0.08 
 (0.16) (0.12) (0.24) (0.16) (0.12) (0.23) 
       
SN_DFE 0.01*** -0.001 0.001 0.01*** -0.001 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
       
SP_DFE 0.002 0.0000 -0.003 0.002 0.0001 -0.002 
 (0.01) (0.003) (0.01) (0.01) (0.004) (0.01) 
       
PC_EARN 0.16*** -0.002 -0.03 0.17*** -0.001 -0.03 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
       
DEC_EARN -0.39*** -0.16* -0.07 -0.41*** -0.15* -0.07 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) 
       
SDEC_EARN -0.003 -0.001 -0.005*** -0.003 -0.0005 -0.005*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
       
SINC_EARN -0.003*** -0.0005 0.001 -0.003*** -0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.001) 
       
CONSTANT -0.21 -0.21 0.34 -0.28 -0.11 0.32 
 (0.71) (0.87) (36.50) (0.82) (0.97) (39.21) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Method Year RE Year RE Year RE Year RE Year RE Year RE 
Clustered F-stat -4.88 1.67*** 0.94 918*** -17.84 1.01 
Observations 17,275 14,789 12,662 16,748 14,315 12,234 
Adjusted R2 0.15 0.01 -0.0003 0.15 0.01 0.0001 
Note. – *p-value < 0.10 **p-value < 0.05 ***p-value < 0.01. All models are estimated with FGLS 
(random year effects). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by firm and year, as well as 
corrected for heteroscedasticity. PC_EARN is the percentage point change in earnings before 
extraordinary items (dollar change scaled by the lagged book value of assets). PC_CSR – change in 
the CSR net percentage score. ROA is earnings before extraordinary items scaled by the book value 
of assets. VOL is the earnings volatility centered around industry means (rolling 20-quarters 
standard deviation of ROA). DFE is the deviation of ROA from its expected value (estimated with 
cross-sectional regressions of ROA on lagged ROA, MB, and SIZE). N_DFE (P_DFE) is the 
negative (positive) value of DFE. DEC_EARN (INC_EARN) stands for percentage point decrease 
(increase) in earnings. Prefix S stands for squared terms. 
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H1: Changes in CFO 
 
Table 4.5: H1 - Linear models of changes in CFO (fixed firm effects) 
 Dependent variable – PC_CFO 
 A. Without volatility B. With volatility 
 𝛕𝛕 = 1 𝛕𝛕 = 2 𝛕𝛕 = 3 𝛕𝛕 = 1 𝛕𝛕 = 2 𝛕𝛕 = 3 
PC_CSR -0.01 -0.01** -0.02** -0.002 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
       
VOL_CFO    0.08 0.27*** 0.03 
    (0.13) (0.09) (0.05) 
       
VOL_CFO * PC_CSR    0.01 -0.003 -0.0002 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
       
PC_CFO -0.07*** -0.01 -0.003 -0.07*** -0.01 -0.004 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
       
ROA_CFO -0.66*** -0.07** -0.04 -0.67*** -0.07** -0.04 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.05) (0.07) (0.03) (0.05) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Method Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE 
Clustered F-stat 134.23*** 7.36*** 2.55* 141.2*** 5.43*** 1.66 
Observations 17,338 14,845 12,705 16,806 14,366 12,274 
Adjusted R2 0.17 -0.16 -0.17 0.17 -0.17 -0.17 
Note. – *p-value < 0.10 **p-value < 0.05 ***p-value < 0.01. All models are estimated with OLS 
(fixed firm effects, within estimator). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by firm and 
year, as well as corrected for heteroscedasticity. PC_CFO is the percentage point change in cash 
flow from operations (dollar change scaled by the lagged book value of assets). PC_CSR – change 
in the CSR net percentage score. ROA_CFO is cash flow from operations scaled by the book value 
of assets. VOL_CFO is the CFO volatility centered around industry means (rolling 20-quarters 
standard deviation of ROA_CFO). 
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Table 4.6: H1 - Linear models of changes in CFO (random year effects) 
 Dependent variable – PC_CFO 
 A. Without volatility B. With volatility 
 𝛕𝛕 = 1 𝛕𝛕 = 2 𝛕𝛕 = 3 𝛕𝛕 = 1 𝛕𝛕 = 2 𝛕𝛕 = 3 
PC_CSR 0.01 -0.01** -0.002 0.01 -0.02*** -0.001 
 (0.01) (0.005) (0.15) (0.01) (0.01) (0.17) 
       
VOL_CFO    -0.07 0.05 0.06 
    (0.05)  (0.04) 
       
VOL_CFO * PC_CSR    0.002 -0.004 0.0000 
    (0.01) (0.004) (0.03) 
       
PC_CFO -0.20*** -0.003 -0.01 -0.20*** -0.005 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
       
ROA_CFO -0.15*** 0.001 0.02 -0.15*** 0.002 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
       
CONSTANT 2.08*** 0.05 0.44 2.01*** -0.05 0.40 
 (0.63) (0.41) (20.00) (0.73) (0.29) (17.50) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Method Year RE Year RE Year RE Year RE Year RE Year RE 
Clustered F-stat 273.56*** -0.56 -1.35 21.63*** -0.85 0.88 
Observations 17,338 14,845 12,705 16,806 14,366 12,274 
Adjusted R2 0.10 -0.0003 -0.0004 0.10 -0.0002 -0.0004 
Note. – *p-value < 0.10 **p-value < 0.05 ***p-value < 0.01. All models are estimated with FGLS 
(random year effects). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by firm and year, as well as 
corrected for heteroscedasticity. PC_CFO is the percentage point change in cash flow from 
operations (dollar change scaled by the lagged book value of assets). PC_CSR – change in the CSR 
net percentage score. ROA_CFO is cash flow from operations scaled by the book value of assets. 
VOL_CFO is the CFO volatility centered around industry means (rolling 20-quarters standard 
deviation of ROA_CFO). 
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Table 4.7: H1 - Non-linear models of changes in CFO (fixed firm effects) 
 Dependent variable – PC_CFO 
 A. Without volatility B. With volatility 
 𝛕𝛕 = 1 𝛕𝛕 = 2 𝛕𝛕 = 3 𝛕𝛕 = 1 𝛕𝛕 = 2 𝛕𝛕 = 3 
PC_CSR -0.01 -0.01** -0.02** 0.003 -0.02* -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
       
VOL_CFO    -0.09 0.23*** 0.08 
    (0.15) (0.09) (0.06) 
       
VOL_CFO * PC_CSR    0.01 -0.004 0.0004 
    (0.005) (0.01) (0.01) 
       
DFE_CFO -0.36*** -0.002 -0.002 -0.36*** 0.01 0.001 
 (0.06) (0.03) (0.10) (0.06) (0.03) (0.09) 
       
N_DFE_CFO 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.005 0.01 0.04 
 (0.13) (0.07) (0.16) (0.14) (0.07) (0.16) 
       
SN_DFE_CFO 0.01 -0.003 0.005 0.01 -0.003 0.005 
 (0.01) (0.004) (0.004) (0.01) (0.004) (0.004) 
       
SP_DFE_CFO -0.01** -0.002 -0.004 -0.01** -0.002 -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.01) (0.003) (0.002) (0.01) 
       
PC_CFO -0.02 0.04 -0.05* -0.02 0.03 -0.05** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) 
       
DEC_CFO -0.34*** -0.12 -0.06 -0.34*** -0.10 -0.05 
 (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) 
       
SDEC_CFO -0.01*** 0.002 -0.01** -0.01*** 0.002 -0.01** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
       
SINC_CFO -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Method Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE 
Clustered F-stat 113*** 3.16*** -5.98 103*** 4.56*** -0.51 
Observations 17,275 14,789 12,662 16,748 14,315 12,234 
Adjusted R2 0.08 -0.16 -0.16 0.07 -0.17 -0.17 
Note. – *p-value < 0.10 **p-value < 0.05 ***p-value < 0.01. All models are estimated with OLS 
(fixed firm effects, within estimator). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by firm and 
year, as well as corrected for heteroscedasticity. PC_CFO is the percentage point change in cash 
flow from operations (dollar change scaled by the lagged book value of assets). PC_CSR – change 
in the CSR net percentage score. ROA_CFO is cash flow from operations scaled by the book value 
of assets. VOL_CFO is the CFO volatility centered around industry means (rolling 20-quarters 
standard deviation of ROA_CFO). DFE_CFO is the deviation of ROA_CFO from its 
expected value (estimated with cross-sectional regressions of ROA_CFO on lagged ROA_CFO, 
MB, and SIZE). ). N_DFE_CFO (P_DFE_CFO) is the negative (positive) value of DFE_CFO. 
DEC_CFO (INC_CFO) stands for the percentage point decrease (increase) in CFO. 
Prefix S stands for squared terms. 
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Table 4.8: H1 - Non-linear models of changes in CFO (random year effects) 
 Dependent variable – PC_CFO 
 A. Without volatility B. With volatility 
 𝛕𝛕 = 1 𝛕𝛕 = 2 𝛕𝛕 = 3 𝛕𝛕 = 1 𝛕𝛕 = 2 𝛕𝛕 = 3 
PC_CSR 0.002 -0.01** -0.001 0.01 -0.02*** 0.0004 
 (0.01) (0.004) (0.16) (0.01) (0.005) (0.17) 
       
VOL_CFO    -0.02 0.01 0.07 
    (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) 
       
VOL_CFO * PC_CSR    0.01 -0.01 0.0004 
    (0.005) (0.004) (0.03) 
       
DFE_CFO -0.37*** -0.02 -0.06 -0.37*** -0.01 -0.06 
 (0.11) (0.08) (0.37) (0.11) (0.08) (0.30) 
       
N_DFE_CFO 0.16 0.04 0.09 0.17 0.04 0.09 
 (0.15) (0.08) (0.66) (0.16) (0.08) (0.52) 
       
SN_DFE_CFO 0.004 -0.003 0.002 0.004 -0.003 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.01) (0.004) (0.004) (0.01) 
       
SP_DFE_CFO 0.002 -0.002 0.003 0.002 -0.002 0.003 
 (0.01) (0.004) (0.01) (0.01) (0.004) (0.01) 
       
PC_CFO 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.03 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.17) (0.05) (0.07) (0.13) 
       
DEC_CFO -0.41*** -0.09* -0.11 -0.41*** -0.09* -0.09 
 (0.09) (0.05) (0.33) (0.09) (0.05) (0.26) 
       
SDEC_CFO -0.01*** 0.002 -0.003 -0.01** 0.002 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
       
SINC_CFO -0.004** 0.0003 -0.001 -0.004** 0.0004 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
       
CONSTANT 0.17 -0.17 0.46 0.13 -0.30 0.45 
 (0.13) (0.53) (20.05) (0.18) (0.44) (17.16) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Method Year RE Year RE Year RE Year RE Year RE Year RE 
Clustered F-stat 35.5*** 4.03*** 0.93 182*** -4.21 0.96 
Observations 17,275 14,789 12,662 16,748 14,315 12,234 
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.003 -0.0001 0.12 0.003 -0.0000 
Note. – *p-value < 0.10 **p-value < 0.05 ***p-value < 0.01. All models are estimated with FGLS 
(random year effects). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by firm and year, as well as 
corrected for heteroscedasticity. PC_CFO is the percentage point change in cash flow from 
operations (dollar change scaled by the lagged book value of assets). PC_CSR – change in the 
CSR net percentage score. ROA_CFO is cash flow from operations scaled by the book value of 
assets. VOL_CFO is the CFO volatility centered around industry means (rolling 20-quarters 
standard deviation of ROA_CFO). DFE_CFO is the deviation of ROA_CFO from its 
expected value (estimated with cross-sectional regressions of ROA_CFO on lagged ROA_CFO, 
MB, and SIZE). N_DFE_CFO (P_DFE_CFO) is the negative (positive) value of DFE_CFO. 
DEC_CFO (INC_CFO) stands for the percentage point decrease (increase) in CFO. 
Prefix S stands for squared terms. 
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H2A: Changes in earnings 
 
Table 4.9: H2A - Changes in earnings of stable and volatile firms (fixed firm effects) 
 
Dependent variable – PC_EARN 
 A. Stable firms B. Volatile firms  
𝛕𝛕 = 1 𝛕𝛕 = 2 𝛕𝛕 = 3 𝛕𝛕 = 1 𝛕𝛕 = 2 𝛕𝛕 = 3 
PC_CSR -0.02 -0.01 -0.05** -0.02** -0.004 -0.03* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
       
LVOL -0.77*** -0.19 0.0004    
 (0.23) (0.42) (0.40)           
LVOL * PC_CSR 0.001 0.01 0.02    
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)    
       
HVOL    1.12*** -0.72 -1.45* 
    (0.39) (0.58) (0.79)        
HVOL * PC_CSR    0.01 -0.01 -0.07** 
    (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)        
PC_EARN 0.02 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 -0.04 -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)        
ROA -0.76*** -0.19*** -0.02 -0.75*** -0.20*** -0.03 
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.07) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Method Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE 
Clustered F-stat 122*** 21.5*** 2.62** 116*** 19.2*** 3.15*** 
Observations 16,806 14,366 12,274 16,806 14,366 12,274 
Adjusted R2 0.21 -0.13 -0.17 0.21 -0.13 -0.17 
Note. – *p-value < 0.10 **p-value < 0.05 ***p-value < 0.01. All models are estimated with OLS 
(fixed firm effects, within estimator). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by firm and 
year, as well as corrected for heteroscedasticity. PC_EARN is the percentage point change in 
earnings before extraordinary items (dollar change scaled by the lagged book value of assets). 
PC_CSR – change in the CSR net percentage score. ROA is earnings before extraordinary items 
scaled by the book value of assets. VOL is the earnings volatility centered around industry means 
(rolling 20-quarters standard deviation of ROA). HVOL (LVOL) takes the value of 1 when VOL 




Table 4.10: H2A - Changes in earnings of stable and volatile firms (random year effects) 
 
Dependent variable – PC_EARN 
 A. Stable firms B. Volatile firms  
𝛕𝛕 = 1 𝛕𝛕 = 2 𝛕𝛕 = 3 𝛕𝛕 = 1 𝛕𝛕 = 2 𝛕𝛕 = 3 
PC_CSR -0.02 0.003 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.002 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.06) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) 
       
LVOL -0.15 -0.25 -0.14    
 (0.18) (0.16) (0.32)           
LVOL * PC_CSR 0.01 0.01 0.01    
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.04)           
HVOL    -0.12 0.05 -0.02 
    (0.33) (0.18) (0.51) 
       
HVOL * PC_CSR    -0.001 -0.02 -0.04 
    (0.04) (0.03) (0.07)        
PC_EARN -0.11*** -0.05*** -0.0002 -0.11*** -0.05*** -0.0001 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)        
ROA -0.27*** -0.07*** -0.02 -0.27*** -0.07*** -0.02 
 (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) 
       
CONSTANT 1.62 0.47 0.49 1.60 0.39 0.45 
 (1.23) (1.05) (35.08) (1.21) (1.06) (35.74) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Method Year RE Year RE Year RE Year RE Year RE Year RE 
Clustered F-stat -3.51 -8.4 0.7 -9.17 -11.35 0.57 
Observations 16,806 14,366 12,274 16,806 14,366 12,274 
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.01 -0.002 0.12 0.01 -0.002 
Note. – *p-value < 0.10 **p-value < 0.05 ***p-value < 0.01. All models are estimated with FGLS 
(random year effects). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by firm and year, as well as 
corrected for heteroscedasticity. PC_EARN is the percentage point change in earnings before 
extraordinary items (dollar change scaled by the lagged book value of assets). PC_CSR – change 
in the CSR net percentage score. ROA is earnings before extraordinary items scaled by 
the book value of assets. VOL is the earnings volatility centered around industry means (rolling 
20-quarters standard deviation of ROA). HVOL (LVOL) takes the value of 1 when VOL is in the 




H2B: Volatility of earnings 
 
Table 4.11: H2B - Earnings volatility (fixed firm effects) 
 
Dependent variable - VOL 
 A. Stable firms B. Volatile firms  
𝛕𝛕 = 1 𝛕𝛕 = 2 𝛕𝛕 = 3 𝛕𝛕 = 1 𝛕𝛕 = 2 𝛕𝛕 = 3 
PC_CSR -0.01** -0.01*** -0.003 0.0002 -0.0003 0.001  
(0.003) (0.004) (0.01) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
LVOL -0.55*** -0.30*** -0.07     
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05)    
       
LVOL * PC_CSR 0.01** 0.01*** 0.004     
(0.003) (0.004) (0.01)    
       
HVOL    1.44*** 0.66*** 0.06 
    (0.13) (0.17) (0.15) 
       
HVOL * PC_CSR    -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.01     (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
       
MB -0.39*** -0.31*** -0.12 -0.36*** -0.31*** -0.12  
(0.08) (0.10) (0.11) (0.08) (0.10) (0.11) 
       
SIZE -0.49*** -0.38*** -0.24*** -0.36*** -0.32*** -0.24***  
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
       
LEV 0.003 0.0001 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.002  
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Method Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE 
Clustered F-stat 44.0*** 11.7*** 6.1*** 33.0*** 9.5*** 4.2*** 
Observations 16,696 14,260 12,180 16,696 14,260 12,180 
Adjusted R2 -0.11 -0.13 -0.16 -0.01 -0.10 -0.16 
Note. – *p-value < 0.10 **p-value < 0.05 ***p-value < 0.01. Models are estimated with OLS (fixed 
firm effects, within estimator). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by firm and year, as 
well as corrected for heteroscedasticity. PC_CSR – change in the CSR net percentage score. 
ROA is earnings before extraordinary items scaled by the book value of assets. 
VOL is the earnings volatility centered around industry means (rolling 20-quarters standard 
deviation of ROA). HVOL (LVOL) takes the value of 1 when VOL is in the top (bottom) quartile 
(25%) among industry peers (2-digit SIC code), and 0 otherwise. MB is the market-to-book ratio 
(natural logarithm of the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of liabilities scaled 
by the book value of assets). SIZE is the natural logarithm of the book value of assets. 
LEV is the book value of long-term debt as a percentage of the book value of assets. 
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Table 4.12: H2B - Earnings volatility (random year effects) 
 
Dependent variable - VOL 
 A. Stable firms B. Volatile firms  
𝛕𝛕 = 1 𝛕𝛕 = 2 𝛕𝛕 = 3 𝛕𝛕 = 1 𝛕𝛕 = 2 𝛕𝛕 = 3 
PC_CSR -0.01 -0.01 -0.002 0.001 0.003 0.005  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.002) (0.002) (0.02) 
       
LVOL -1.19*** -0.99*** -0.81***     
(0.06) (0.06) (0.14)    
       
LVOL * PC_CSR 0.01 0.02** 0.01     
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)    
       
HVOL    2.80*** 2.23*** 1.76*** 
    (0.12) (0.14) (0.32) 
       
HVOL * PC_CSR    -0.03* -0.04* -0.02     (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) 
       
MB 0.25** 0.16 0.05 0.18* 0.11 0.03  
(0.12) (0.13) (0.24) (0.10) (0.11) (0.31) 
       
SIZE -0.54*** -0.51*** -0.48*** -0.33*** -0.36*** -0.36***  
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
       
LEV 0.005** 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
       
CONSTANT 3.64*** 3.38*** 2.90 1.29** 1.63** 1.58 
 (0.80) (0.82) (9.37) (0.64) (0.71) (15.22) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Method Year RE Year RE Year RE Year RE Year RE Year RE 
Clustered F-stat 29.6*** 29.9*** 72.9*** 64.7*** 59.7*** 70.1*** 
Observations 16,696 14,260 12,180 16,696 14,260 12,180 
Adjusted R2 0.25 0.27 0.28 0.42 0.38 0.36 
Note. – *p-value < 0.10 **p-value < 0.05 ***p-value < 0.01. Models are estimated with FGLS 
(random year effects). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by firm and year, as well as 
corrected for heteroscedasticity. PC_CSR – change in the CSR net percentage score. 
ROA is earnings before extraordinary items scaled by the book value of assets. 
VOL is the earnings volatility centered around industry means (rolling 20-quarters standard 
deviation of ROA). HVOL (LVOL) takes the value of 1 when VOL is in the top (bottom) quartile 
(25%) among industry peers (2-digit SIC code), and 0 otherwise. MB is the market-to-book ratio 
(natural logarithm of the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of liabilities scaled 
by the book value of assets). SIZE is the natural logarithm of the book value of assets. 




Levels of earnings/CFO 
Table 5.1: Earnings levels 
 Dependent variable – ROA 
 A. Without volatility B. With volatility 
 𝛕𝛕 = 1 𝛕𝛕 = 2 𝛕𝛕 = 3 𝛕𝛕 = 1 𝛕𝛕 = 2 𝛕𝛕 = 3 
PC_CSR 0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.03*  
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)        
VOL    0.58 0.80*** 0.35     (0.40) (0.30) (0.37)        
VOL * PC_CSR    0.01 -0.002 -0.01     (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)        
PC_ROA 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.09** 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.08***  
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)        
ROA -0.002 -0.17*** -0.19*** 0.01 -0.14*** -0.18***  
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04)        
MB 7.68*** 2.43*** 0.38 7.62*** 2.29*** 0.25  
(0.60) (0.71) (0.64) (0.58) (0.73) (0.64)        
SIZE -1.39*** -2.51*** -2.05*** -1.10*** -2.14*** -1.91***  
(0.43) (0.47) (0.48) (0.35) (0.42) (0.45) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Method Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE 
Clustered F-stat 42.9*** 10.07*** 10.94*** 39.22*** 7.85*** 29.58*** 
Observations 14,804 12,670 10,849 14,364 12,274 10,490 
Adjusted R2 -0.03 -0.12 -0.13 -0.02 -0.11 -0.14 
Note. – *p-value < 0.10 **p-value < 0.05 ***p-value < 0.01. All models are estimated with 
OLS (fixed firm effects, within estimator). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by 
firm and year, as well as corrected for heteroscedasticity. ROA is earnings before 
extraordinary items scaled by the book value of assets. PC_CSR – change in the CSR net 
percentage score. VOL is the earnings volatility centered around industry means (rolling 20-
quarters standard deviation of ROA). PC_ROA is the percentage point change in ROA. 
MB is the market-to-book ratio (natural logarithm of the sum of the market value 
of equity and the book value of liabilities scaled by the book value of assets). 
SIZE is the natural logarithm of the book value of assets. 
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Table 5.2: CFO levels 
 Dependent variable – ROA_CFO 
 A. Without volatility B. With volatility 
 𝛕𝛕 = 1 𝛕𝛕 = 2 𝛕𝛕 = 3 𝛕𝛕 = 1 𝛕𝛕 = 2 𝛕𝛕 = 3 
PC_CSR 0.001 -0.004 0.01 0.004 -0.01 0.02 
 (0.004) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
       
VOL_CFO    -0.13 -0.10 -0.26*** 
    (0.13) (0.12) (0.09) 
       
VOL_CFO * PC_CSR    0.002 -0.01 0.01* 
    (0.004) (0.01) (0.004) 
       
PC_ROA_CFO 0.003 0.05** 0.05*** 0.005 0.05** 0.05*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
       
ROA_CFO 0.12** -0.04 -0.10*** 0.11** -0.05 -0.10*** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) 
       
MB 3.20*** 2.61*** 1.87*** 3.15*** 2.55*** 1.79*** 
 (0.63) (0.47) (0.39) (0.65) (0.48) (0.38) 
       
SIZE -0.49 -0.81*** -0.86*** -0.60 -0.88** -1.00*** 
 (0.33) (0.31) (0.27) (0.37) (0.36) (0.30) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Method Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE 
Clustered F-stat 15.26*** 27.14*** 11.14*** 12.87*** 20.46*** 9.88*** 
Observations 14,804 12,670 10,849 14,364 12,274 10,490 
Adjusted R2 -0.11 -0.14 -0.16 -0.11 -0.14 -0.16 
Note. – *p-value < 0.10 **p-value < 0.05 ***p-value < 0.01. All models are estimated with OLS (fixed firm 
effects, within estimator). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by firm and year, as well as 
corrected for heteroscedasticity. ROA_CFO is cash flow from operations scaled by the book value of assets. 
PC_CSR – change in the CSR net percentage score. VOL is the CFO volatility centered around industry 
means (rolling 20-quarters standard deviation of ROA_CFO). PC_ROA_CFO is the percentage point 
change in ROA_CFO. MB is the market-to-book ratio (natural logarithm of the sum of the market 
value of equity and the book value of liabilities scaled by the book value of assets). 
SIZE is the natural logarithm of the book value of assets. 
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Advertising and R&D expenditures 
Table 5.3: Advertising and R&D expenditures 
 Dependent variable – PC_EARN 
 A. Without volatility B. With volatility  
𝛕𝛕 = 1 𝛕𝛕 = 2 𝛕𝛕 = 3 𝛕𝛕 = 1 𝛕𝛕 = 2 𝛕𝛕 = 3 
PC_CSR -0.02 -0.01 -0.08*** -0.01 -0.01 -0.08*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)        
VOL 0.39** -0.28 -0.62** 0.40** -0.27 -0.62** 
 (0.19) (0.37) (0.30) (0.20) (0.38) (0.31)        
VOL * PC_CSR -0.003 0.001 -0.03** 0.0001 -0.001 -0.03** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)        
PC_EARN 0.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)        
ROA -0.74*** -0.20*** -0.04 -0.75*** -0.20*** -0.04 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06)        
PC_ADEX    0.15 -0.14 0.09 
    (0.09) (0.16) (0.20) 
       
PC_ADEX * PC_CSR    -0.01 -0.02* 0.0003 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
       
PC_RDEX    -0.03 0.08 0.08 
    (0.08) (0.08) (0.14) 
       
PC_RDEX * PC_CSR    0.02 -0.02 -0.01 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Method Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE 
Clustered F-stat 156.17*** 18.15*** 5.86*** -277.73 14.05*** 0.96 
Observations 16,806 14,366 12,274 16,753 14,331 12,252 
Adjusted R2 0.22 -0.13 -0.16 0.22 -0.13 -0.16 
Note. – *p-value < 0.10 **p-value < 0.05 ***p-value < 0.01. All models are estimated with OLS (fixed 
firm effects, within estimator). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by firm and year, as 
well as corrected for heteroscedasticity. PC_EARN is the percentage point change in earnings 
before extraordinary items (dollar change scaled by the lagged book value of assets). 
PC_CSR – change in the CSR net percentage score. ROA is earnings before extraordinary items 
scaled by the book value of assets. VOL is the earnings volatility centered around industry means 
(rolling 20-quarters standard deviation of ROA). PC_ADEX is the percentage point change in the 




Alternative CSR scores 
Table 5.4: Conservative CSR (ex. Corporate Governance and Product) 
 Dependent variable – PC_EARN 
 A. Without volatility B. With volatility 
 𝛕𝛕 = 1 𝛕𝛕 = 2 𝛕𝛕 = 3 𝛕𝛕 = 1 𝛕𝛕 = 2 𝛕𝛕 = 3 
PC_CSR_XGP -0.02 -0.004 -0.04** -0.02 0.003 -0.08*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)        
VOL    0.39** -0.27 -0.62** 
    (0.19) (0.37) (0.30)        
VOL * PC_CSR_XGP    -0.005 0.01 -0.03*** 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)        
PC_EARN 0.02 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 -0.04 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)        
ROA -0.76*** -0.19*** -0.02 -0.74*** -0.20*** -0.04 
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Method Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE 
Clustered F-stat 155*** 28.6*** 2.9** 130*** 20.1*** 7.6*** 
Observations 17,338 14,845 12,705 16,806 14,366 12,274 
Adjusted R2 0.22 -0.13 -0.17 0.22 -0.13 -0.16 
Note. – *p-value < 0.10 **p-value < 0.05 ***p-value < 0.01. All models are estimated with OLS (fixed 
firm effects, within estimator). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by firm and year, as 
well as corrected for heteroscedasticity. PC_EARN is the percentage point change in earnings 
before extraordinary items (dollar change scaled by the lagged book value of assets). 
PC_CSR_XGP – change in the CSR net percentage score that excludes the Corporate Governance 
and Product categories. ROA is earnings before extraordinary items scaled by the book value of 
assets. VOL is the earnings volatility centered around industry means (rolling 20-quarters standard 
deviation of ROA). 
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Table 5.5: Internal CSR (Diversity and Employee Relations) 
 Dependent variable – PC_EARN 
 A. Without volatility B. With volatility 
 𝛕𝛕 = 1 𝛕𝛕 = 2 𝛕𝛕 = 3 𝛕𝛕 = 1 𝛕𝛕 = 2 𝛕𝛕 = 3 
PC_CSR_INTER -0.01 0.002 -0.02 -0.01 0.001 -0.04*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)        
VOL    0.39** -0.28 -0.63** 
    (0.20) (0.37) (0.30)        
VOL * PC_CSR_INTER    -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.02*** 
    (0.004) (0.004) (0.01)        
PC_EARN 0.02 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 -0.04 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)        
ROA -0.76*** -0.19*** -0.02 -0.75*** -0.20*** -0.04 
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Method Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE 
Clustered F-stat 152*** 22.7*** 2.5* 157*** 13.2*** 4.3*** 
Observations 17,277 14,845 12,705 16,745 14,366 12,274 
Adjusted R2 0.22 -0.13 -0.17 0.22 -0.13 -0.16 
Note. – *p-value < 0.10 **p-value < 0.05 ***p-value < 0.01. All models are estimated with OLS (fixed 
firm effects, within estimator). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by firm and year, as 
well as corrected for heteroscedasticity. PC_EARN is the percentage point change in earnings 
before extraordinary items (dollar change scaled by the lagged book value of assets). 
PC_CSR_INTER – change in the internal CSR net percentage score that only includes the Diversity 
and Employee Relations categories. ROA is earnings before extraordinary items scaled by 
the book value of assets. VOL is the earnings volatility centered around industry means (rolling 20-
quarters standard deviation of ROA). 
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Table 5.6: External CSR (Community, Environment, Human Rights) 
 Dependent variable – PC_EARN 
 A. Without volatility B. With volatility 
 𝛕𝛕 = 1 𝛕𝛕 = 2 𝛕𝛕 = 3 𝛕𝛕 = 1 𝛕𝛕 = 2 𝛕𝛕 = 3 
PC_CSR_EXTER -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02* 0.01 -0.05* 
 (0.004) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03)        
VOL    0.40** -0.28 -0.61** 
    (0.19) (0.37) (0.30)        
VOL * PC_CSR_EXTER    -0.01 0.01** -0.01 
    (0.004) (0.005) (0.01)        
PC_EARN 0.02 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 -0.04 -0.002 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)        
ROA -0.76*** -0.19*** -0.02 -0.74*** -0.20*** -0.05 
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Method Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE Firm FE 
Clustered F-stat 141*** 18.3*** 1.7 109*** 19.0*** 2.2* 
Observations 17,336 14,845 12,705 16,804 14,366 12,274 
Adjusted R2 0.22 -0.13 -0.17 0.22 -0.13 -0.16 
Note. – *p-value < 0.10 **p-value < 0.05 ***p-value < 0.01. All models are estimated with OLS (fixed 
firm effects, within estimator). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by firm and year, as 
well as corrected for heteroscedasticity. PC_EARN is the percentage point change in earnings 
before extraordinary items (dollar change scaled by the lagged book value of assets). 
PC_CSR_EXTER – change in the external CSR net percentage score that only includes the 
Community, Environment, and Human Rights categories. ROA is earnings before extraordinary 
items scaled by the book value of assets. VOL is the earnings volatility centered around industry 
means (rolling 20-quarters standard deviation of ROA). 
 
